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The safety of the people is the Supreme law.**
Introduction
Justice Frankfurter put it well: "In law.., the right answer usu-
ally depends on putting the right question."' My basic point is that
major aspects of systems of legal justice deal with antisocial behavior.
That an aspect of these systems may be categorized as "criminal,"
"civil," "state," "federal," or "international," is relevant principally to
a question of legal theory or governmental organization, which is fun-
damentally secondary to the character of the behavior itself.2 In
short, we have to look at the behavior first-and only then ask ques-
* William J. and Dorothy O'Neill Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; A.B.
1957, J.D. 1960, University of Notre Dame. Professor Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws of the United States Senate Judiciary Committee from
1968 to 1972. He was also a consultant to the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws. See Act of Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1516, as amended, Act of July 8, 1969, 83
Stat. 44. The assistance of Kirsten M. Donne, Angela D. Collette, and Robert Palmieri (all
Class of 1995, Notre Dame Law School) in the collection of these materials is gratefully
acknowledged.
** MorNrrsoumu, SPimrr oF =hE LAws bk. XXVI, ch. 23 (Ewing ed., 1751).
1. Estate of Roberts v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410, 413 (1943).
2. The criminal/civil distinction, for example, is rooted in history, not the essential
character of things, though it has constitutional implications. See, eg., Hicks v. Feiok, 405
U.S. 624, 631 (1988) (criminal or civil labels affixed to contempt as proceeding under state
law not controlling for federal constitutional analysis). See generally Mary M. Cheh, Con-
stitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Under-
standing and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HAsrNGs L.J. 1325
(1991); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and
Civil Law, 101 YALE L. 1795 (1992).
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tions of legal theory or governmental organization. Holmes also put it
well: "The first call of a theory of law is that it should fit the facts." 3
This Symposium-or at least some of its participants-are asking the
wrong question. We should not be talking about "federalization."
That is a constitutional question to which we now have a fairly clear
constitutional answer. Little or no need presses on us to debate it
anew. Here we need only turn to the history of lotteries in the nine-
teenth century, which amply demonstrates that our federal and state
systems of criminal justice are not-as the "federalization" question
tends uncritically to assume-mutually exclusive. 4 In fact-if not in
theory-they exercise "concurrent jurisdiction" today over most
forms of antisocial behavior-at least on the domestic side. The na-
tion needs lawyers who read more than law reports; its needs can be
3. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 167 (Howe ed., 1963).
4. The appendix to this Article sets out materials that trace the development of fed-
eral criminal law. Unless this history is to be rewritten, it is time to turn to the question of
how the nation's systems of state and federal justice can be made to work to meet the
needs of its people. But see infra note 93. It is time, too, to turn away from sterile ques-
tions of theory divorced from needs, for theory to one side, no meaningful distinction can
be drawn, in fact, between the operation of state and federal courts. "[We] need to view
our systems as one resource and use that resource as wisely and efficiently as we can."
Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Conference on State-Federal
Judicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REV. 1657, 1658 (1992).
Unless efforts are made to draw functional distinctions between the two systems of
justice, however, the alternatives are stark. The Committee on Long Range Planning of
the Judicial Conference of the United States argued in its Proposed Long Range Plan for
the Federal Courts:
The allocation of limited jurisdiction to the federal courts is justified both in
theory and as a practical necessity. Unless a distinctive role for the federal court
system is preserved, there is no sound justification for having two systems. If
federal courts were to begin exercising, in the normal course, the broad range of
subject-matter jurisdiction traditionally allocated to the states, they would lose
both their distinctive nature and, due to burgeoning dockets, their ability to re-
solve fairly and efficiently those cases of clear national import and interest that
properly fall within the scope of federal concern. Under that unfortunate scena-
rio, all courts-federal and state-might as well be consolidated into a single sys-
tem to handle all judicial business. To follow this course-toward either a single
national court system or two systems engaged in essentially identical businesses-
would be disastrous.
COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 19 (Nov. 1994) [here-
inafter COMMrITEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING]. Nevertheless, the Committee recog-
nized that, "[als Congress continues to 'federalize' crimes previously prosecuted in the
state courts, and to create civil causes of action over matters previously resolved in the
state courts," that is precisely what is happening. Id. at 20. Legally, the state and federal
courts, in short, largely exercise concurrent jurisdiction over most matters. The task facing
the nation is to rationalize that jurisdiction functionally. That is the task that this Sympo-
sium should have set for itself. That it did not was a tragic waste of intellectual resources.
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more easily seen by reading newspapers.5 If we want to make a mean-
ingful evaluation of our federal system of criminal justice, we ought to
focus most sharply on asking, for example, if it is adequately respond-
ing to those forms of international antisocial behavior that only it has
the legal and other resources to meet. That is a question worth taking
up. Unfortunately, I have heard too little about that sort of question
in these proceedings.6
I. Ideology
What Cardozo said of law may be said of criminal justice: Each
person tends to see it through his or her own eyes. 7 Many perspec-
tives could, of course, give us a better view. Nevertheless, insight into
5. This is not to gainsay that the "workload of the federal courts [is not] continu[ing]
to grow substantially." AD rnSTRAn OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1992 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 10 [hereinafter U.S. CouRs 1992]. While in 1962 only 4,800
appeals were docketed and 100,000 district courts matters filed, in 1992, the figures rose to
47,000 and 277,000, nearly a tenfold increase in appeals and a threefold increase in district
court filings. Id. The rise in criminal filings, however, has not been as sharp: there has
been only a 27% increase over the last ten years. Id. fig. 1. In fact, excluding the District
of Columbia, during "the period 1955 to 1991 total criminal filings in the district courts
ranged from a low of about 28,000 cases (1956-61 and 1980) to a high of about 47,000 (1972
and 1989). During the period since 1930, although the nature of the crimes prosecuted and
the types of cases have changed, total federal filings have remained within a limited range,
averaging about 35,000 cases annually." NORMAN ABRAMs & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW Am h-s ENFORCEMENT 12 (2d ed. 1993). In contrast, reports from 35
states, including the most populous states except Pennsylvania, indicate that more than
1,077,000 felony cases are filed each year at the state level. Id. at 13. While criminal filings
have remained relatively stable, district court judgeships have increased from 245 in 1960
to 649 in 1993, an 165% increase. COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 4,
tbl. 6. This should be contrasted with the 1,798 active state trial court judges. BUREAU OF
JusTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS 1993 tbl. 221.66 [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK 1993].
6. Here, too, Holmes put it well:
The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history. History
must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know the precise scope
of rules which it is our business to know. It is a part of the rational study, because
it is the first step toward an enlightened skepticism, that is, toward a deliberate
reconsideration of the worth of those rules.
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight,
you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to get
him out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him and
make him a useful animal. For the rational study of the law the black-letter man
may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics
and the master of economics.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 83, 96-97 (1897).
7. "We may try to see things as objectively as we please. Nonetheless, we can never
see them with any eyes except our own." BENsAMI N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE
JumIcLAL PRoCESS 13 (1921).
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a particular aspect of a problem is often reified. The error lies in
treating abstractions as if they were concrete objects. "Federaliza-
tion" is an abstraction. We need to turn our attention to more con-
crete objects. But "federalization" is not the only abstraction that
stands in the way of effective solutions to practical problems.
Our earliest legal traditions responded to antisocial behavior by
making criminal justice a substitute for revenge or an instrument to
promote the public peace. 8 Religious thought, particularly after the
Reformation, tended to equate law with morality. Crime became sin,
and punishment found its rationale in expiation. During the Enlight-
enment, the criminal law became a means of crime prevention
through deterrence of rationally responsible individuals. In the mod-
em day, many people turn away from any view holding that individu-
als are morally or rationally responsible. 9 Instead, they see antisocial
8. See generally MORRIS RAPHAEL COHEN, REASON AND LAW 25-72 (Collier ed.,
1961) (overview of perspectives on criminal law); RoscoE PouND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 26-35, 59-61 (1929); LEON RADZINOWICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME: A STuDY OF
CRIME IN ITS HISTORICAL AND SocIAL CONTEXT (1966); Elliott Currie, Crime, Justice, and
the Social Environment, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRr-nouE 294-313 (rev.
ed. 1990); Graham Hughes, Concept of Crime, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
294-301 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
9. For example, in a 1993 national survey, people were given proposed reasons for
crime and asked whether they considered them "critical," "important," or "not important."
Thirty-eight percent of those surveyed believed that the influence of drugs was a "critical"
factor influencing crime; 45% found the availability of guns to be "critical"; 38% believed
television to be a "critical" influence; 36% felt that absence of fathers in young people's
homes was a "critical" influence on crime; finally, the poor quality of schools was voted
"critical" by 34%. Of those surveyed, 51% also considered lack of moral training in the
home to be "critical." Nevertheless, phrased in this way, it is a question, not of the individ-
ual's moral responsibility, but of the moral character of his environment. In short, people
today tend to believe that some factor other than the individual himself is responsible for
the individual's conduct. A similar question was also asked regarding the main causes of
violent crime; people were asked to name, on their own, three or four factors that they
believed to be the main causes of violent crimes. Drug abuse was rated highest, with 51%
of the people naming it; 41% stated that crime was caused by parents' failure to teach right
and wrong. "Lack of morals" did come in third, but notably it tied with "living in poverty"
and "guns being easy to get." Other reasons given included child abuse, exposure to televi-
sion, influence of friends, alcohol abuse, and lack of education. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra
note 5, tbls. 2.24, 2.25.
Additionally, those surveyed were asked whether certain environmental influences
contributed a "lot," a "little," or "not at all" to violence. Lack of adult supervision of
children, easy availability of handguns, television, and movies each were thought by a ma-
jority to contribute "a lot" (89%, 70%, 61%, and 60% respectively). Video games and
local television news reports were thought by fewer people to contribute "a lot" to vio-
lence, but the results were not insignificant; 38% of those surveyed thought video games
contributed "significantly" to violence, while 40% thought they contributed "a little." Sim-
ilarly, only 35% of participants in the survey felt that local news reports contributed "a
lot," but 46% felt that they did contribute "a little." Id tbl. 2.26. Public perception of the
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behavior as principally the product of environment or aberrations of
personality. Crime is explained not by reference to original sin or
conscious choice, but rather to poverty, passion, discrimination, or
mental disease. Reform of these social or economic conditions, or of
the offender, become prime goals.10 Issues of legal theory or govern-
mental organization are of less significance.
None of these ideological outlooks is wholly wrong or wholly
right. If each had emerged merely to supplement-but not to sup-
plant-the other, we might have developed a better perspective, for
criminal justice is all of these things, yet none of these things. Instead,
discussions of criminal justice today are marred by the extremes of
right and left. "Conservatives" feel the need for security, denounce
our loss of a sense of personal responsibility, and tend to support the
forces of law enforcement. "Liberals" see a threat to liberty, chide
our insensitivity to social injustice, and tend to seek alternatives to
effective law enforcement. Similarly, questions of legal theory or gov-
ernmental organization like "federalization" misdirect our attention
from-in Pound's justly famous phrase-"the law in action to the law
in the books."'" Viewed through an ideological framework, proposals
from each side are too often viewed as mutually exclusive alternatives.
Debate becomes emotional and polarized. Division, deadlock, and
delay are the result. Stubborn ideology faces stubborn ideology. But
if ideologies are stubborn, so are facts.
relationship between television and crime was also reflected in the response to the ques-
tion, "Do you think there is a relationship between violence on television and the crime
rate in the United States, or not?" Seventy-five percent responded "yes." Id. tbl. 2.110.
Here, too, some factor other than the individual himself was thought to be responsible.
People are seen today, in short, to be dependent causes, not independent causes.
10. Increasingly, the public sees, for example, such social changes as restricting the
supply of drugs as an effective tool for combatting crime. BUREAU oF JusTICE STATSTICS,
U.S. DEP'T oF JusTIcE, TECHNICAL APPENDIX DRUGS, CRME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
32 (1993). On a more general level, the following question was posed to subjects of a 1993
national survey "To lower the crime rate in the United States some people think addi-
tional money and effort should go to attacking the social and economic problems that lead
to crime, through better education and job training. Others feel more money and effort
should go to deterring crime by improving law enforcement with more prisons, police, and
judges. Which comes closer to your view?" Fifty-one percent stated that money should be
spent on social and economic problems; only 38% believed the money would be better
spent on police, prisons, and judges; 10% were undecided. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note
5, tbl. 2.43.
11. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REv. 12 (1910).
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Iff. Kinds of Crime
Traditionally, we have classified crimes in terms of individual ac-
tions-murder, rape, robbery, and the like. When the task is the as-
sessment of antisocial behavior, this approach is not only inadequate,
but misleading. Antisocial behavior must be analyzed in terms of
more than legal definitions or organizational theory. For present pur-
poses, it is far more meaningful to speak of "street crime," "white
collar crime," and "organized crime"-of whatever sort.' 2 This topol-
ogy permits us to focus on the people involved and the consequences
of their actions for others. Then-and only then-does it make sense
to talk about how our legal systems should respond-or are respond-
ing-to them.
A. Street Crime
Many Americans today consider "crime"'13 to be one of the most
12. See generally Don Gibbons, Typologies of Criminal Behavior, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 1572-76.
13. In the 1964 Presidential campaign, "crime in the streets" became a national issue;
it led to the enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, and the creation of the ill-fated Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, the rise and fall of which is ably chronicled and analyzed in THOMAS E.
CRONIN ET AL., U.S. v. CRIME IN THE S=aErS (1981). Any effort to rethink the federal
system of criminal justice-much less to integrate it functionally with state and local sys-
tems-needs to begin with an analysis of what happened and why with the 1968 Act. The
Cronin book is a good place to begin, particularly its concluding chapter. The authors'
concluding remarks in the book first approvingly quote these sobering, but thoughtful con-
clusions of now-Dean Gerald Caplan, then a LEAA official, in an address entitled, "Losing
the War on Crime":
First, we have more crime than any other place in the world, more this year
than last, and much, much more than we had in 1964 when Senator Goldwater
became the first Presidential candidate to argue that the Federal government
must do something about crime in the streets.
Second, most of the increase occurred in the midst of high employment, and
unprecedented affluence and during a period when the Federal government
launched a new, multi-billion dollar anti-crime program.
Third, despite the persistent, often clarion, calls for "law and order," no sig-
nificant strengthening of the punitive or deterrence features of the criminal justice
system took place during the past decade.
Fourth, efforts to understand better the underlying causes of crime have
progressed little. Even among serious observers, the attachment to particular ex-
planations has been promiscuous, one theory yielding to another in quick
succession.
Fifth, today virtually no one-scholars, practitioners and politicians alike-
dares to advance a program which promises to reduce crime substantially in the
near future.
The authors then concluded:
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serious domestic problems. 14 Rightly or wrongly, they fear crime, and
the cilme they fear is the crime that affects their personal safety, espe-
cially on our public streets.15 While our primarily rural population of
The national role in fighting crime in the streets is, and will doubtless remain,
a small one. Any prudent national crime control policy will need better data,
more experiments, better evaluation, and more focused research. Such a policy
should concentrate on juvenile justice and continue to work towards certainty of
sentencing. More money is needed for systematic research and development of
crime prevention strategies. The national government should be much more in
the business of designing, testing, and publicizing crime prevention strategies than
of pouring out money and organizing conferences. It should continue to improve
crime statistics, develop evaluation methods, and run pilot research programs. A
more scientific approach will not necessarily reduce crime but could enable us to
understand who is helped or hurt by different strategies and how much various
strategies cost.
These days it is fashionable to talk of the limits of government. But the limits
of government are a pallid excuse for the political exploitation of the crime issue,
the mismanagement of LEAA, and the ineffective national leadership that char-
acterized so much of the war on crime.
TWelve years, however, is a short time for what should have been viewed as a
long-term campaign. Focus and stamina, over the long haul, have been cardinal
ingredients in almost all policy successes. If we have learned to be skeptical about
presidential promises, if we have learned government alone cannot solve the
crime problem, if we have learned there is a price inexact but high, that must be
paid if we are to make sure crime doesn't pay, then we have profited by this
defeat. Politics will not-and should not-be separated from crime control policy
while the solutions are still uncertain and while there still are confficting values to
be addressed. But politics that amounts to fact-free rhetoric, politics that does
not make frank reference to value conflicts, can be dangerous. We now know it
was dangerous to play to the public's fears, to oversell LEAA as a "war" on
crime, to claim successes in time for the next election. It will be dangerous not to
examine the causes of crime, not to debate where accountability should be placed,
and not to lay down straight what the cost of crime control is.
In his second address to Congress, Abraham Lincoln put it this way:
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The
occasion is piled high with difficulty and we must rise with the occasion. As our
case is new, so we must think anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we
shall save our country.
Id. at 181-82.
14. When asked in 1993 what two forms of social change were most desired for the
United States in the next five years, 25% of those surveyed stated that they wished crime
would decrease. This was second only to better health care, and it was equal to lower
unemployment. SOURCBOOK 1993, supra note 5, tbl. 2.4. In a 1994 survey, 56% of those
questioned stated that crime was one of the two most serious problems facing our country.
This far exceeded the runner-up, health care, which came in at 21%. In a related question,
36% of those surveyed responded that crime was one of the two most important issues for
the government to address. This was second to health care, which received 45% of the
vote. Id tbl. 2.2.
15. When asked in 1993 how uneasy they felt on the streets, 41% of a national survey
of respondents stated that they felt more uneasy than they did only one year ago.
SouRcEBooK 1993, supra note 5, tbl. 2.34. Forty-three percent of respondents stated that
they would feel afraid to walk alone at night even in their own neighborhood. Id tbl. 2.39.
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yesterday could view crime as characteristic of a removed and im-
moral city, our primarily urban and suburban population of today
looks at crime as an immediate threat.16
More generally, survey participants were asked how often they worried about several other
situations. While the majority responded that the listed situations worried them "pretty
seldom" or "very seldom," the percentages that responded they worried about these sev-
eral situations "very frequently" or "pretty frequently" were significant, that is, 15% were
"very frequently" worried about themselves or a family member being sexually assaulted
or raped; 23% worried about it "pretty frequently." The prospect of having their homes
burglarized when they were gone worried 14% of the survey participants "very frequently"
and 21% "pretty frequently." Nine percent and twelve percent, respectively, worried
about a burglary when they were there. 'Telve percent worried "very often" about being
attacked while driving their cars; 16% worried about it "pretty often." Eleven percent of
respondents worried "very frequently" about getting mugged, beaten up, knifed, or shot;
15% worried "pretty often" about muggings and 12% "pretty often" about getting beaten,
knifed, or shot. Finally, 8% of respondents worried very frequently about being murdered,
while 11% worried about it pretty frequently. Id tbl. 2.30. In 1993, 54% of respondents in
a national survey felt the crime rate in their areas was increasing. Only five percent said
they felt it was decreasing. Thirty-nine percent believed no real change had occurred. In a
related question, people were asked whether they felt more or less uneasy on the streets as
compared to a year ago. Forty-two percent felt "more uneasy"; only 5% felt less so. Fifty-
one percent felt "not much different." Both of these questions have been asked for se-
lected years between 1966 and 1993, and with respect to the first question, a consistent
majority replied that they felt the crime rate was increasing in their areas, as opposed to
decreasing or remaining the same; as for the second question, the "not much different"
category outweighed the "more uneasy" category in several years. Nevertheless, the cate-
gory responding that they felt less uneasy was consistently small-it never exceeded 10%.
Id tbl. 2.32.
16. The nation's population at the time of the first census in 1790 was small-only 4
million; by 1850 it was only 23 million. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL His-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 7 (1965) [hereinaf-
ter STATISTICAL HISTORY]. The nation was then sparsely settled, with only 5 people per
square mile in 1790; by 1850 only 8 people per square mile. Id. at 8. The nation itself was
small; in 1790 it contained less than a million square miles; by 1850 it contained less than 3
million. Id. People lived in rural areas, and the nation was composed of a stable, largely
homogeneous people; and they farmed, largely by hand. In 1790 just over 200,000 lived in
cities; by 1850 just over 3,500,000 did. Id. at 9. Cities, too, were small; in 1790 the nation
had no cities over 50,000 in population; by 1850 there were only 10. Id at 14.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the population had grown. By
1930 it had risen to 123 million. The nation's population density was 34 per square mile.
Id at 8. The northeastern part of the United States was, of course, much higher-210 per
square mile. Cities, too, were even much higher: New York City had 22,000 per square
mile. U.S. BOOK OF FACTS, STATISTICS & INFORMATION 13, 20 (1965). The nation was no
longer small; the shift from rural area to city was well past the halfway mark. STATISTICAL
HISTORY, supra, at 9. The early nation of small farmers was, in short, fast disappearing.
For a list of factors that ought to be considered in interpreting data on crime, see PREsI-
DENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 27 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 PRESIDENT'S REPORT]; it includes
density and size of population and the metropolitan area of which it is a part and the
economic status of the people.
Currently, less than one-quarter of the nation's population resides in rural areas. Bu-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME VICnRMIZATION IN CITY, SUB-
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Rather than walk in their neighborhoods at night, many city
dwellers stay behind locked doors.17 Poor people spend money they
cannot afford on taxis because they are afraid to use public transpor-
tation.18 Moreover, what many people fear is the stranger, often the
stranger of another race.1 9 Fear of crime makes our people want to
move from the neighborhoods in which they live.20 This seemingly
uRBAN, Am RURAL AREAS iii (1992). Not only has the nation's population become more
urban, but it has become alarmingly clear that crime is particularly an urban phenomenon.
Between 1987 and 1989, the average annual rate of violent victimization among city resi-
dents was 92% higher than among rural residents; the rate of theft and household crimes
for city residents also exceeded the rates for rural residents by approximately 90%; nation-
wide, city and suburban areas each accounted for approximately 42% of violent victimiza-
tion, compared to 16% in rural areas. Id. at 1. Thus, while the majority of rural residents
surveyed in 1992 felt that crime was increasing in their areas, the crime rate is still signifi-
cantly lower there than in urban and suburban areas. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5, tbl.
3.36.
17. In 1993, 61% of city dwellers stated that they would be afraid to walk alone at
night in some area within a mile of where they lived. These data are especially striking in
light of the national results as a whole: those that would not feel afraid (56%) outnum-
bered those who said they would (43%). SouRcEBooK 1993, supra note 5, tbl. 2.39.
Although not broken down into place of residence, a related question indicated that peo-
ple in general felt safer at home alone at night than on public transportation, walking, or
driving alone at night. Sixty-one percent of those questioned stated that they felt "very
safe" at home, while 36% stated that they felt this level of safety out walking. Conversely,
29% felt "somewhat" or "very" unsafe when walking alone at night, but only 10% re-
ported the same uneasiness when at home alone'at night. Id tbl. 2.31.
18. In 1993 people were asked about the level of safety they felt alone at night using
public transportation and about how safe they felt alone at night driving. While only 33%
of those surveyed said they felt "very safe" or "somewhat safe" on public transportation,
80% felt "very safe" or "somewhat safe" driving. Conversely, 45% of respondents said
they felt "somewhat unsafe" or "very unsafe" using public transportation alone at night;
only 16% felt the same uneasiness driving. Id. tbl. 2.31. Obviously, many poor people do
not own cars of their own; thus, they are put to the choice of taking public transportation-
which they fear-or taking taxis-which they cannot afford.
19. Id. tbl. 2.42.
20. Arrests for weapon law violations among juveniles aged 10 through 17 increased
almost 63% over the decade spanning 1980 to 1990. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, U.S. DE'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRnME REPORTS 1991, tbl. 5.1. In the years 1985-
1988, the majority of crimes of violence and theft against victims aged 12 through 15 oc-
curred at school, either in the building or on the surrounding property. Crimes against
teens between 16 and 19 were also more likely to occur at school. Specifically, crimes of
violence against 12 to 15 year olds occurred at school 37% of the time, and violent crimes
against those aged 16 through 19 occurred at school 17% of the time. For 12 to 15 year
olds, school was the most common place for violent crime to occur; for 16 to 19 year olds, it
was the second most likely place (with a place near the victim's home being the most
common). Crimes of theft against 12 to 15 year olds were overwhelmingly more likely to
occur at school than elsewhere: 81% of the time, thefts against people of this age group
occurred at school. Although the percentage for 16 to 19 year olds was much lower (39%),
it was still more likely for thefts against these teens to occur at school than other places.
BUREAAU OF JusrxcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, TEENAGE Vicrims: A NATIONAL
CRIME SURVEY REPORT tbl. 14 (1991) [hereinafter TEENAGE VIcTIMs].
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ubiquitous fear is impoverishing the lives of many Americans. PTA
meetings and church services are not held at night. Library facilities
and other cultural opportunities are under-used. Kids carry guns to
school for protection. 21 Women at night fear any footstep behind
them.22 We are an intimidated, not a free society.
Today it is not unusual, too, for a victim of a crime to go unaided.
The normal bonds of community seem to be breaking up. People are
reluctant to "get involved." Crimes also go unreported to the police,23
Weapons used in homicides of teenage victims in 1986 were predominantly firearms of
some sort: 58% of victims aged 12 to 15 and 67% of victims aged 16 to 19 were killed with
a handgun, rifle, shotgun, or other type of gun. Further, statistics in that year indicated
that a significant number of victims were murdered by someone in their own age group.
Sixty percent of victims aged 12 through 15 were murdered by an offender aged 12 through
19, and 37% of victims aged 16 through 19 were murdered by offenders between ages 12
and 19. Id. tbls. 20, 22. In a 1991 survey, only 2% of students reported taking something
(such as a gun) to school to protect themselves. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SCHOOL CRIME: A NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REPORT
12 (1991) [hereinafter CRIME VICTIMIZATION].
Nevertheless, statistics indicate that many school-related crimes go unreported, which
may partially account for this low number. Specifically, in about 37% of all crimes on
school property, the police were not called; the crime was instead reported to a school
official or someone in a similar capacity. These percentages should be compared to the
mere 5% of unreported violent crimes on the streets. TEENAGE VICIMS, supra, at 10.
21. Other recent statistics indicate that the problem of violence at school may be rap-
idly increasing. In 1993, 22% of teens said they sometimes feared for their safety at school.
Additionally, teens were asked how big of a problem was presented in their schools by
students bringing weapons like guns or knives to school. Twenty-nine percent said that
they thought it was a "very big" or "fairly big" problem. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5,
tbls. 2.77, 2.78.
22. Respondents were asked for selected years ranging from 1973 to 1993 whether
they felt afraid to walk alone at night in their own neighborhoods; the group responding
"no" consistently outnumbered the group reporting that they were afraid, but for each year
surveyed, more than half of the women respondents indicated that they were afraid, and
the percentage of women responding "yes" in each year greatly outnumbered the percent-
age of men who so responded. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5, tbl. 2.39.
23. While general trends in reporting crimes to the police were slightly up as of 1992,
the percentages were still well below the 50% mark; only 39% of all crimes and only 37%
of personal victimizations were reported to the police. Crimes of violence were most likely
to be reported, with 50% of all such crimes being called to police attention. When crimes
of violence were broken down into more specific categories, reported rapes totaled 53%,
robberies 51%, aggravated assaults 62%, and simple assaults 43%. Household crimes were
reported 41% of the time (more specifically, 54% of burglaries, 26% of larcenies, and 75%
of motor vehicle thefts were reported). Crimes of theft were only reported 30% of the
time. CRIME VICTIMIZATION, supra note 20, at 5. While teenagers were more likely than
adults to be crime victims in 1985 through 1988, crimes against adults were the most likely
and crimes against teenagers were generally the least likely to be reported to law enforce-
ment agencies. TEENAGE VICTIMS, supra note 20, at 9.
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for people feel-rightly-that the police can do little to protect
them.24 They are not only afraid, but increasingly hopeless and angry.
Public alarm is warranted, although it reflects misperceptions. A
majority of all major crime against the person-rapes, robberies, and
assaults-occurs in fact on the street or in other public places. 25 Hon-
est disputes are present about the figures, but our best indicators tell
24. Many respondents who failed to report crimes to the police cited as reasons their
belief that the police are "inefficient, ineffective, or biased" or that they "would not want
to be bothered." BuREAu OF JusTC STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, HIGHLIGHTS
FROM 20 YEARS OF SURVEY NG CRIME Vicrims: THr NATIONAL CRIME VIcrimizATION
SURVEY, 1973-92, at 33 (1993) [hereinafter IGHLIGHTS]. When asked how much confi-
dence they had in general in the police, 45% of participants in a 1994 survey answered that
they had "some," "very little," or "no confidence" in the police. SOUREBOOK 1993, supra
note 5, tbl. 2.8. With respect to the ability of the police to protect them, specifically from
violent crime, 54% responded that their confidence in the police was not very much or
none at all. Id. tbl. 2.17. Here, as in many other areas, race seems to play a factor; 45% of
those surveyed in 1993 felt that police protection in Black neighborhoods was worse than
in White neighborhoods, while only 41% of the Whites surveyed responded similarly. Id.
tbl. 2.18.
25. In a breakdown of crimes of violence that occurred in 1992, more occurred on a
public street, not near the victim's home, than in any other place. Almost 26% of rapes
occurred on such streets. In addition, just over 4% of rapes occurred on streets that were
near the victim's home; just over 6% occurred at a parking lot or garage; and nearly 9%
occurred in an apartment yard, park, field, or playground. Assaults occurred on streets not
near the victim's home (17% of simple assaults and just over 27% of aggravated assaults)
in nearly 21% of the cases. As for other public places, the statistics are as follows:
LOCATION TOTAL SnspLE AGGRAVATED
On Street near Home 4.0 3.1 5.8
On Street near Friend's,
Relative's, or Neighbor's
Home 1.4 0.9 2.4
Inside Bar, Restaurant, or
Nightclub 6.0 7.3 3.5
Parking Lot or Garage 7.3 7.0 8.0
In School Buildings 7.0 9.4 2.3
On School Property 7.1 7.7 5.8
On Public Transportation or in
Station 1.2 1.3 1.0
In Apartment Yard, Park, Field,
or Playground 4.4 4.1 5.1
Robberies were even more likely than rapes or assaults to occur in public places.
Nearly 40% of all robberies occurred in streets not near the victim's home. This figure
included nearly 45% of completed robberies (over 43% with injury and over 45% without)
and nearly 30% of attempted robberies (over 41% with injury and over 25% without).
Other public places where robberies were likely to occur were on streets near the home
(almost 6%), in restaurants, bars and nightclubs (1%), in parking lots or garages (nearly
14%), inside school buildings (nearly 3%), on school property (1%), in apartment yards,
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us that the various forms of street crime are not increasing. 26 While
the rates are dropping, few contend that the nation does not have an
intolerably high rate of crime. Certainly, then, our people have a valid
concern about street crime.
Yet all aspects of public fears are not fully justified. Apart from
robbery, many violent crimes against the person-murders, rapes, and
assaults-are committed by family members, friends, or other persons
previously known to their victims. 27 It is true that race is a factor in
parks, fields or playgrounds (6%), and on public transportation or inside stations (nearly
3%). SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5, tbl. 3.5.
26. Between 1973 and 1992, personal crimes dropped 26%; crimes of theft, 35%; and
household crimes, 30%. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5, tbl. 3.3. Compare Dirk Johnson,
Bank Robberies Soaring Despite the Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1995, at Al (reporting that
bank robberies-typically netting less than $2,500 and for which three of four perpetrators
are caught-hovered around 2,000 annually in the 1970s then shot up to 5,000 in the 1990s;
the record was 9,300 in 1991; 1993 had 8,800) with Clifford Krauss, Burglaries Show Big
Decline in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at A12 (reporting that burglaries in
city and suburbs dropped; 1974 marked the modern-day high nationally (93.1 per 1,000
households), dropping to 62.7 in 1985 and 48.7 in 1992; the drop in New York City was
attributed in part to police tactics that resulted in more arrests and convictions, including
taking fingerprints at the scene and computerized fingerprinting processing).
27. Crimes of violence-rape, robbery, and assault-are predominately committed by
strangers, 3.9 million versus 2.6 million; however, the percentages (60% vs. 40%) do not
reflect the nation's disproportionate fear of the stranger. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5,
tbl. 3.23. Of the 22,540 murders in 1992, 3,053 were clearly thought to be stranger homi-
cides, while in 8,818 the victim had an unknown relation to the offender; the rest were
homicide by those who were related to or known by the victim. ld tbl. 3.125. Neverthe-
less, the trend in homicides is converging on the nation's worst fears. If felony-type
murders (those committed in connection with rape (137), robbery (2,254), burglary (206),
etc. and drugs (1291) as well as other offenses) are added to gangland killings (137) and
juvenile gang killings (809), the resulting number (5,833) is an increasing percentage of all
homicides (nearly 26%). SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5, tbl. 3.125. In 1965, 31% of all
homicides occurred within the family; in 1992 the figure had dropped to 12%. FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1993 tbl.
5.3 [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1993]. While the nation's homicide rate per
100,000 was 9.3 in 1992, the historical high actually occurred in 1980 (10.2), a rate that
roughly doubled from 1965 (5.1). Id at 283. The most striking change is the number of
victims from 15 to 24, nearly a 50% jump; the victim rate by race and age reveal that
Blacks aged 24 and younger constitute 41% of Black murder victims, which makes homi-
cide the leading cause of death for young, Black males. Id. The Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation concluded:
The typical assumptions associated with homicides throughout this century must
be reevaluated in view of the unprecedented shift in national homicide patterns as
evidenced during the 1990's. Every American now has a realistic chance of mur-
der victimization in view of the random nature the crime has assumed. This no-
tion is somewhat supported by the fact that a majority of the Nation's murder
victims are now killed by strangers or unknown persons. The advent of this trend
has generated a profound fear of murder victimization in that the circumstances
surrounding homicides are perceived to be more irrational. In the past, the ac-
cepted normality was based upon clearly defined circumstances such as felonies,
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street crime. The ratio of Blacks among arrested perpetrators is
higher than that of Whites.28 Nevertheless, to get a complete picture,
factors relating to socioeconomic conditions must be correlated with
passion, and arguments among family members or acquaintances. The concern
about homicide is further perpetuated by youthfulness of both victims and offend-
ers, as illustrated by the rise in juvenile gang killings during the past decade. The
reasons for these changes in homicide patterns are multidimensional. Some sug-
gested causal factors are related to the illicit drug trade, the disintegration of the
family unit, and weapon proliferation.
Id. at 286-87. While homicide data increases tend to be the most reliable, they understate,
in fact, the increase in violence in the nation, as they depend on the contingent fact of
death. In short, modern technology, widely employed in emergency services and hospitals,
prevents an unknown number of aggravated assaults from becoming homicides. See War-
ren E. Leary, More Gun Violence, and Better Care for Victims, N.Y. TIMus, Oct. 23, 1994,
§ 1, at 32 ("Most gun wound experts feel they are doing a better job of saving the shooting
victims they see, even with the increasing use of semiautomatic pistols that fire more shots
and the greater use of more potent, higher caliber, higher-velocity guns."). See generally
Fox Butterfield, A Historical Study of Homicide and Cities Surprises the Experts, N.Y.
TAEs, Oct. 23, 1994, § 1, at 16 ("Historians now say that homicide rates were extraordina-
rily high in Europe during the Middle Ages-and high in the United States during the
early 19th century-then declined steadily until the 1960s.... [A]n increase in state power
and courtly manners beginning in the 16th and 17th centuries helped curb impulsive, vio-
lent behavior.... The 60's ... marked a shift among many social, cultural and economic
forces that worked against violence in previous eras. America began moving into a post-
industrial economy, government authority came into question with the Vietnam war, and
the traditional family was threatened by things like divorce."). From 1984 to 1993, the
aggravated assault rate, in fact, jumped from 215.8 assaults to 440.1 assaults per 100,000
people, that is, 103.9%. Id tbl. 1.
28. Black Americans made up 12% of the population in 1990. WoRmD ALMANAC
Am Boor oF FACTS 1992, at 72 (Mark S. Hoffman ed.) [hereinafter ALMANAC 1992]. Yet
they made up 26% of those arrested. UNuwonM CRmE REPORTS 1991, supra note 20, tbl.
38. Of crimes of violence, 59% of those arrested for murder and nonnegligent manslaugh-
ter, nearly 46% for rape, nearly 63% for robbery, and nearly 43% for aggravated assault
were Blacks. Id. Researchers differ on the interpretation of these arrest data; the dis-
agreements are ably summarized in Charles V. Willie & Ozzie L. Edwards, Race and
Crime, in 4 ENcYCLOPEDiA oF CRIME AND JusTICE, supra note 8, at 1347, 1350:
Most of the research on race and crime has been concerned with differences
in the crime rates of blacks and whites. One can hardly address the subject of
traditional crime without being confronted with these differences. Some people
deny that these differences are real, suggesting instead that they are a function of
the sources of data compiled by researchers or the bias of law enforcement
agents.
It is difficult to accept the position that the totality of black-white crime-rate
differences can be attributed to such measurement errors. The fact is that for self-
reported crimes and crimes reported by officials, the seriousness of offenses com-
mitted by blacks is likely to be greater, even when the crime rate is similar to that
for whites. However, the criteria by which society measures the seriousness of a
crime are not altogether without bias. White-collar crimes, corporate crimes, and
syndicate crimes involve far more money than do the crimes that command the
greatest share of the attention of the criminal justice system. Such crimes, by
fostering unhealthy, impoverished, and even dangerous working and living condi-
tions, may also produce much more human suffering and loss of life.
April 1995] PROSECUTIVE DISCRETION
street crime.29 Non-Whites are also disproportionately victimized by
street crimes-with the exception of larceny.30 Both the criminal and
This analysis has focused on economic and residential correlates that seem to
link race and crime. The most significant of these is clearly class distinction.
Rather than saying that traditional crime is disproportionate among blacks, Mexi-
can-Americans, Puerto Ricans, or other ethnic minorities, one should say that it is
disproportionate among poor members of these groups, and that these groups are
disproportionately poor in American society. Thus, the cause-and appropriate
solutions-will be seen to be much more social than biological or psychological in
nature. Categorizing the criminal population in this way does not create complete
homogeneity, but it reduces the variation to such an extent that explanations and
solutions are far less difficult.
A second variable of critical significance is "community," a term that can be
broadly defined to include such characteristics as size of place, racial composition,
and social interaction patterns. These variables, in turn, represent such underly-
ing conditions as social integration, type of social control (formal versus infor-
mal), and social stability. Such conditions probably account for the fact that
youth crime rates are highest in poor, racially mixed neighborhoods rather than in
neighborhoods that are simply poor or racially and ethnically different. Hence, it
is not poverty alone, or merely the social consequences of minority status, that
lead to delinquent behavior. Rather, it is in part the social conditions which char-
acterize a community that constitute the preconditions for crime.
29. The point was authoritatively made long ago. PRESxDEwr's COMM'N ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JusTCE, TASK FORCE REPORT. CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN
ASSESSMENT 78 (1967); it remains valid. See generally supra note 28. Despite gains-
Black married couples had 84% of the income of White married couples-an all-time
high-the poverty rate for Blacks in 1991 remained the highest for any group in the nation:
nearly 32%. ALMANAC 1992, supra note 28, at 134. Sadly, the Black gain was not real; it
resulted from a disproportionate drop in the income of White men, which fell almost 4%,
the third consecutive year of decline. Id. The real, per capita income of all Americans
declined in 1991 for the first time in eight years, by almost 3%. Id. The future is not
bright. See Keith Bradsher, Gaps in Wealth in U.S. Called Widest in West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
17, 1995, at Al (reporting that economic inequality is on rise in U.S. since 1970s; 10% of
population holds 40% of wealth, in contrast to Great Britain; there, 1% of the population
holds 18%, down from 1920 when it held 59%; the top 20% of Americans (with incomes of
$180,000 or more) hold 80% of wealth).
30. Generally, Blacks have had significantly higher violent victimization rates than
Whites or persons of other races; households headed by Blacks have the highest rates of
household crimes, while Hispanics have somewhat higher violent victimization rates than
non-Hispanics, and they have higher rates of household crimes than non-Hispanics. HIGH-
LIGHTS, supra note 24, at 18-19. In 1992 the rate of victimization per 1,000 people age 12 or
older was higher for Blacks (4.7) than for Whites (15.6). The data was the same for assault
victimizations in 1992; Whites had a rate of 24.6 while Blacks' rate was 33.5. The rate per
1,000 females age 12 or older was slightly higher for Blacks (1.0) than for Whites (0.8),
while the 1992 data showed a slightly higher victimization rate for Blacks (60.4) than for
Whites (58.8); the trend in previous years (the study collected data on 1973 through 1992)
indicated that, generally, Whites had a higher larceny victimization rate. SOURCEBOOK
1993, supra note 5, tbls. 3.26-3.29. In a 1990 study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, data
were collected on average annual victimization rates by race of victim and type of crime
from 1979 to 1986. Blacks were more likely to experience crimes of violence than Whites.
The overall rates were 44.3 for Blacks and 34.5 for Whites; when broken down, Whites had
a slightly higher rate of simple assault (18.9) than Blacks (16.0), but Blacks were more
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his victim tend to be from a broken home, poor, uneducated, unem-
ployed, and a member of a minority group.3 1 Street crime is plainly
related to socioeconomic factors.
B. White-Collar Crime32
While street crime continues to occupy our attention, too little is
said of white collar crime-fraud, embezzlement, tax evasion, price
often victimized by rape (1.5 as opposed to 0.8), robbery (13.0 as opposed to 5.4), and
aggravated assault (13.8 as opposed to 9.3). The difference in household crimes was even
more apparent: Blacks had an overall rate of 260.7, while that of Whites was only 201.0.
Blacks were more likely to be victimized in each of the categories in the study: burglary
(108.4 as opposed to Whites' 72.4), household larceny (127.9 as opposed to Whites' 113.7),
and motor vehicle theft (24.5 as opposed to Whites' 14.9). Larceny is an exception: Whites
were more likely to experience crimes of theft than Blacks (80.5 as opposed to 77.1), while
Blacks were more likely to experience personal larceny with contact (5.6 as opposed to
2.6), Whites were more likely to experience personal larceny without contact (77.9 as op-
posed to 71.4). BUREAU OF JuSTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT:
BLACK VicriMs 2 (1990).
31. Among other groups, Blacks, Hispanics, and the poor tend to have higher victimi-
zation rates than persons who do not possess these characteristics. CRIME VIcrIMIzATION,
supra note 20, at 6. Aside from simple assault, in which the victimization rate for Whites
(16.8) was slightly higher than that for Blacks (15.2), Blacks were more likely to become
victims. Specifically, the robbery rate for Blacks was 15.6, as opposed to Whites' 4.7;
Blacks' rate for aggravated assault was 18.3, while Whites' was only 7.8; and Blacks' rate
for crimes of theft (60.4) exceeded that for Whites (58.8). Hispanics were more likely to
experience all crimes in the study than non-Hispanics. Their rate for robbery was 10.6,
while that for non-Hispanics was 5.4; their rate of aggravated assault (10.0) exceeded that
for non-Hispanics (16.4); and Hispanics' rate for crimes of theft (61.9) was higher than that
for non-Hispanics (58.9). The statistics followed a similar pattern when victims were bro-
ken down into income brackets. While crimes of theft were almost as likely to happen to
those in the highest ($50,000 or more family income) bracket (71.0) as to those in the
lowest (less than $7,500; rate 72.3), other crimes were much more likely to occur to those in
the lower brackets. The rates for the lowest and highest brackets, respectively, were as
follows: robbery, 11.1 and 3.7; aggravated assault, 23.1 and 5.5; simple assault, 28.8 and
11.4. For the middle brackets, seven in all, the rates fluctuated between these two ex-
tremes. ld. at 6. While those who were never married were the most likely to experience
both crimes of theft and violence, the "divorced/separated" group had significantly higher
rates of victimization than those that remained married. Specifically, the violent crime rate
was 19 for married men and 44 for divorced or separated men; for women, the rates were
11 and 45, respectively. For crimes of theft, married mens' rate was 43, while that for
divorced or separated men was 95. Married women were also less likely to experience
crimes of theft (44) than divorced or separated women (74). HIGHLIGHTs, supra note 24,
at 18.
32. See generally White-Collar Crime, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
99th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. I-I1 (1986); STAFF OF HOUSE SuBcOml. ON CRIME, 95TH CONG.,
2D SEss., WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: THm PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE
(Committee Print 1978); CHAMBER OF CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, WmTE-
COLLAR CRIME 6 (1974) (reporting annual estimate of cost: $47.78 billion); Stanton
Wheeler, White-Collar Crime History of an Idea, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 1652.
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rigging, double dealing in securities, and the like.33 In 1949 Edwin
Sutherland published his seminal study, White Collar Crime, which
was an analysis of the crimes committed by seventy of the largest
manufacturing, mining, and mercantile corporations in this country.34
Over an individual "life career" of forty-five years, the seventy corpo-
rations had an average of fourteen criminal convictions each.35 Today,
statistics on this type of crime are not systematically collected.36 At-
tention is usually focused elsewhere. Seldom do people find white
collar crimes in the headlines, so it is of less concern to them.
Many liberals also do not speak of white collar crime because it
does not fit neatly into their ideology. How can it be "crime" if it is
not the product of ignorance, poverty, discrimination, or disease? 37
Many conservatives do not speak of it either because they might have
33. Questions are often raised on the definition "white-collar crime." See generally
HERBERT EDELHERTZ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NATURE, IMPACT, AND PROSECUTION
OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 3 (1970). Specifically, should it be categorized by the nature of
the offense, by the characteristics of the offenders, or by the relationship between the of-
fenders and their occupations? The most common method of definition seems to be by
offense characteristics, and crimes typically categorized as "white-collar" include those
mentioned here. "Fraud" is defined as "the intentional misrepresentation of fact to unlaw-
fully deprive a person of his or her property or legal rights, without damage to property or
actual or threatened injury to persons." Tax cases are often considered a subcategory of
fraud. BUREAU OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME:
SPECIAL REPORT 2 (1987) [hereinafter WHITE-COLLAR 1987] (citing DICTIONARY OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA TERMINOLOGY: TERMS AND DEFINITIONS PROPOSED FOR IN-
TERSTATE AND NATIONAL DATA COLLECTION AND EXCHANGE (2d ed. 1981)). "Embez-
zlement" is defined as "the misappropriation, misapplication, or illegal disposal of property
entrusted to an individual with intent to defraud the legal owner or intended beneficiary."
The difference between fraud and embezzlement is that embezzlement involves a breach of
trust that had previously existed between the victim and offender. Id. Securities cases
generally fall into the category of "forgery," that is, "the alteration of something written by
another person or writing something that purports to be either the act of another or to
have been executed at a time or place other than was in fact the case." Id
34. EDWIN HARDIN SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (1961).
35. Id. at 20.
36. The Bureau of Justice Statistics only published its first survey of state white-collar
offenses in 1986 and its first survey of federal offenses in 1987. WHITE-COLLAR 1987, supra
note 33, at 1.
37. SUTHERLAND, supra note 34, at 5-9. According to a study of white-collar offenses
in 1984-85, white-collar offenders were much more likely to be White than non-White;
overall, 66% of those arrested for white-collar offenses were White, while 34% were non-
White; in each specific category aside from forgery-where Whites only outnumbered non-
Whites by 4%-Whites outnumbered non-Whites by substantial margins:
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to attack members of their own socioeconomic class or race.38 Its im-
pact on our nation, however, can be great.3 9 The final damage figures
CRIMM % WHT % NON-WHITE
Tax Fraud 93 7
LendinglCredit Fraud 81 19
Wire Fraud 69 31
Other Fraud 62 38
Embezzlement 68 32
Counterfeiting 76 24
Regulatory Offense 90 10
Id. at 7.
38. Id. at 33. Some courts are revealingly candid in expressing their attitudes toward
alleged white-collar offenders. The Second Circuit, for example, suggested that the civil
use of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.,
against "respected and legitimate enterprises" was "extraordinary, if not outrageous."
Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479
(1985). E.F. Hutton was included among the cited "legitimate enterprises." Id. But see
Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F2d 384, 395 n.14 (7th Cir. 1984),
affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) ('T]he white collar crime alleged in some RICO complaints
against 'legitimate' businesses is in some ways at least as disturbing .... "); Chris Welles,
Why the E.F. Hutton Scandal May Not Be Over, Bus. WK., Feb. 24, 1986, at 98 (E.F. Hut-
ton pleads guilty to 2,000 counts of mail fraud multi-million dollar bank scam). Those who
make such remarks are apparently unaware of the substantial body of literature on white-
collar crime by so-called respected businesses. See, e.g., Irwin Ross, How Lawless Are Big
Companies, FORTUNE, Dec. 1, 1980, at 56 (1,043 major corporation between 1970-1980:
117 convictions or consent decrees for 98 antitrust violations; 18 kickbacks, briberies, or
illegal rebates; 21 illegal political contributions; 11 frauds; 5 tax evasions). On the scope of
criminal and civil RICO, including filing, see infra note 66 and accompanying text.
39. The Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report concluded:
Although white collar offenses are less visible than crimes such as burglary
and robbery, their overall economic impact may be considerably greater. Among
the white collar cases filed by U.S. Attorneys in the year ending September 30,
1985, more than 140 persons were charged with offenses estimated to involve over
$1 million each, and 64 were charged with offenses valued at over $10 million
each. In comparison, losses from all bank robberies reported to police in 1985
were under $19 million, and losses from all robberies reported to police in 1985
totaled about $313 million.
WHrr-CoLLAR 1987, supra note 33, at 1. The 1967 PR-sIDmEN's REPORT, supra note 16,
also concluded:
During the last few centuries economic life has become vastly more complex.
Individual families or groups of families are not self-sufficient; they rely for the
basic necessities of life on thousands or even millions of different people, each
with specialized functions, many of whom live hundreds or thousands of miles
away.
[White-collar crime [is]-[a term] now commonly used to designate those
occupational crimes committed in the course of their work by persons of high
status and social repute [that] ... are only rarely dealt with through the full force
of criminal sanctions.
Serious erosion of morals accompanies [the white collar offender's violation].
[Those who so] flout the law set an example for other businesses and influence
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cannot yet be calculated, but the savings and loan debacle may have
cost the nation as much as $500 billion.40 President Bush told the
individuals, particularly young people, to commit other kinds of crime on the
ground that everybody is taking what he can get.
See also JOHN E. CONKLIN, "ILLEGAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL": BUSINESS CRIME IN AMERICA
129 (1977):
[T]he criminal justice system treats business offenders with leniency. Prose-
cution is uncommon, conviction is rare, and harsh sentences almost non-existent.
At most, a businessman or corporation is fined; few individuals are imprisoned
and those who are serve very short sentences. Many reasons exist for this leni-
ency. The wealth and prestige of businessmen, their influence over the media, the
trend towards more lenient punishment for all offenders, the complexity and in-
visibility of many business crimes, the existence of regulatory agencies and inspec-
tors who seek compliance with the law rather than punishment of violators all
help explain why the criminal justice system rarely deals harshly with business-
men. This failure to punish business offenders may encourage feelings of mistrust
toward community morality, and general social disorganization in the general
population. Discriminatory justice may also provide lower class and working
class individuals with justifications for their own violation of the law, and it may
provide political radicals with a desire to replace a corrupt system in which equal
justice is little more than a spoken ideal (citations omitted).
40. Nathaniel C. Nash, U.S. Has Trouble Coping with Its Savings Empire, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 1990, at Al (reporting 1991 "healthy" institutions with $639 billion in assets, 400
"sick" institutions with $360 billion in assets, 157 "insolvent" institutions with $113 billion
in assets, and 393 "seized" institutions with $193 billion in assets); Nathaniel C. Nash, Pol-
icy Shift on Bailouts Is Explored, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1990, at D1 (reporting that regulators
warn that the number of institutions will exceed 600, and may go as high as 800, with assets
approaching $500 billion); Michael Quint, New Estimate on Savings Bailout Says Cost
Could Be $500 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1990, at Al (reporting estimate of General
Accounting Office over 30-year period).
The degree to which fraud contributed to the debacle, as well as the extent of the
losses, is in dispute. Congressional and other studies put the figure high. H.R. REP. No.
1088, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 2-13 (1988) (stating that criminal misconduct by insiders is a
major contributing factor in approximately one-third of all commercial bank failures and
three-fourths of all thrift failures and estimating loss from $31 to $80 billion); OFFICE OF
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK FAILURE: AN EVALUATION OF THE FACTORS
CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL BANKS 9 (1988) (finding that insider abuse
is a significant factor in 35% of the bank failures); see Savings Unit Fraud Cited, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1990, at C2 (reporting testimony of L. William Seidman, Chairperson of
FDIC and RTC, that 60% of savings and loan associations seized are tainted by fraud,
which is more than triple the rate of commercial banks, and 1200 possible criminal prose-
cutions have been referred to the Department of Justice). On a present value basis, the
loss may be lower: $150-175 billion. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT, ORIGINS AND CAUSE OF THE S & L DEBACLE:
A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 4 (1993). The Commission concluded, too, that fraud was not
the principal cause of the debacle; it was
a consequence of the perverse incentives, permissive regulation, and inadequate
supervision that had been built into the system. While most S & L operators did
not succumb to the temptation, the ability to use insured deposits for risky invest-
ment was too tempting for some. The profit potentials produced imprudent risk-
taking, abusive practices, and fraud. There was a continuum of abusive practices
running from aggressive pursuit of profit, and search for regulatory loopholes, to
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country that "uconscionable risk-taking, fraud, and outright criminal-
ity [were] factors" that led to the crisis.41 Economically, street
crime-theft and burglary-merely transfers wealth, usually from the
rich to the poor. Yet, forms of fraud, price fixing, and the collusive
allocation of markets undermine the trust that is essential to the work-
ing of our free enterprise system and typically transfer wealth from
the poor and the middle class to the rich. When an individual in the
upper middle class evades taxes, less revenue is available for needed
social services, and persons whose wealth is more visible must make
up the difference. In fact, we have ample reason for concern here,
too.
C. Organized Crime 42
The public's attitude toward organized crime is strangely ambiva-
lent. While academics debate whether a group such as the Mafia even
exists,43 the core of domestic organized crime actually does consist of
out-and-out fraud. Abusive practices of one form or another, mainly by S & L
managers and owners but also by unscrupulous attorneys, accountants, apprais-
ers, and investment bankers, figured in substantial taxpayer losses." Id. at 8.
While the Commission, concluded that fraud only accounted for 10-15% of the
losses sustained in the debacle, it found nonetheless that the fraud was "unprece-
dented" and "repugnan[t]." Id.
The S & L debacle affected the work load of the courts. U.S. COURTS 1992, supra note 5, at
66 (7% increase-1359 to 1448-in cases dealing with lending institution fraud). See gener-
ally id. at 69-71.
41. Maureen Dowd, Bush Savings Plan Call for Sharing the Cost Broadly, N.Y.
TImEs, Feb. 7, 1989, at Al.
42. See generally Francis AJ. Ianni & Elizabeth Reuss-lanni, Organized Crirnme
Overview, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 1094; G. ROBERT
BLAKEY & RICHARD N. BILLINGS, FATAL HOUR: THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
KENNEDY BY ORGANIZED CRIME 204-95 (1992) (tracing the history of organized crime and
violence); Report of Ralph Salerno: Investigation of the Assassination of President John F.
Kennedy: Hearings of House Select Comm. on Assassinations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. Vol. IX,
app. 1-60 (1979) (tracing history of FBI investigations including the use of electronic
surveillance, of organized crime).
43. When Senator Kefauver's Committee first examined the issue in depth in 1950, it
concluded that "[t]here is a Nationwide crime syndicate known as the Mafia .... " S. RE'.
No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1951) (Special Committee to Investigate Crime in Inter-
state Commerce, 3d Interim Rep.); see WnLIAm HOwARD MOORE, Tim KEFAUVER COM-
mTTEE Am TH-E POLITICS OF CRimE 1950-1952 (1974). Nevertheless, the origins of the
word "mafia" reveal that it was originally used to refer to a way of life, not a group of
people. While the individuals in 19th century Sicily who exemplified the values reflected in
the concept of "mafia"--which, maybe surprisingly, included integrity, beauty, and excel-
lence-were called "mafiosi,'? the word "mafia" was never used to refer to the people, but
only the values they embodied. Accordingly, academics debate whether modern organized
crime groups are Tightly called "the Mafia." See, e.g., JOSEPH L. ALBIm, THm AmERICAN
MAFIA: GENESIS OF A LEGEND 135 (1971) ("'Mafia' then is not an organization. It is a
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system of patron-client relationships that interweaves legitimate and illegitimate segments
of Sicilian society. 'Mafioso' is not a rank or position within the patron-client relationship
of Sicilian society itself."); Charles 'filly, Foreword to ANTON BLOK, THE MAFIA OF A
SICILIAN VILLAGE XiV (1973) ("Sicily has never had any single organization one could
properly call The Mafia .... On the other hand, there really are mafiosi-men wielding
power through the systematic use of private violence. The sum of their actions makes up
the phenomenon called mafia."); HENNER HEss, MAFIA AND MAFIOSI: THE STRUCTURE
OF POWER 127 (Evald Osers trans., 1974) ("Mafia is neither an organization nor a secret
society, but a method. In his social relations, the mafioso has recourse to physical violence
or threatens such recourse. By means of this private application or threat of violence,
declared illegal by the State, the mafioso not only achieves a personal material or prestige
gain but also discharges certain functions within the sub-cultural system by entering the
service of others."). Others, in fact, skeptically question the existence of a national organi-
zation. See, e.g., LAWRENCE MEIR FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 272-73 (1993) (footnotes omitted):
One factor that fed the movement toward federal involvement [in crime con-
trol] was fear of organized crime, "the syndicate," or the "Mafia." The Mafia was
supposed to be a giant criminal conspiracy made up of Italian gangsters (Sicilians,
to be specific). Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee headed a special committee
of Congress to investigate racketeering and organized crime. The Kefauver Com-
mittee claimed it uncovered a lot of dirty linen, and it made superb use of public-
ity in the process. The committee's message was that the Mafia had its tentacles
in every major city; it was growing rich and powerful on the spoils of vice and
crime.
Viewed in the cold light of hindsight, Kefauver seems to have produced little
in the way of hard evidence. But he produced a lot in terms of images and head-
lines, which to Kefauver and others on his committee were far more important. In
the early sixties, the Justice Department under Attorney General Robert Ken-
nedy also paid special attention to crime families and their networks. Whether
any of this burst of activity did much good is also doubtful. But the Mafia theme
was endlessly fascinating to the general public.
Was there a national Mafia, connected by ties of blood and sacred oaths?
The evidence was, in fact, rather slim (or at least controversial); but the media
hardly cared. The Mafia made good reading-good fodder for movies, books,
and magazine articles.
The notion of a vast, hydra-headed crime syndicate had other values, too. It
was a simple and satisfying explanation for at least some of the crime that plagued
the nation. It put the blame on a single monster, an identifiable presence, a
defeatable enemy-and a foreign enemy, at that. This belief was much more
comforting than the main competing theory: that crime was a diffuse, poisonous
substance that came, as it were, from nowhere, an invisible enemy, subtle and
mysterious. Or the idea that crime had deep, difficult social and economic roots.
Moreover, if the Mafia was a reality, who better to fight this vast interstate octo-
pus than the federal government, the only entity capable of fighting and winning
the war against crime? Only national power had any hope of destroying organ-
ized crime.
Sociologists may be forgiven, but the sight of an eminent historian of law who appar-
ently does not read law reports is remarkable. See, e.g., United States v. Losascio, 6 F.3d
924, 943 (2d Cir. 1993) (prosecution of La Cosa Nostra boss John Gotti), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1645 (1994); United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1117-28 (1st Cir. 1993) (prosecu-
tion of Patriarca Family under RICO; induction ceremony recorded); United States v.
Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1982) (RICO prosecution of "members of La Cosa
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twenty-four highly structured groups operating in our largest cities
across the nation, concentrated mainly in the Midwest and North-
east.44 Their internal organization is patterned after the Mafia groups
of Sicily.45 No one, though, ought to take comfort in the usual prac-
tice of identifying the ethnic character of the principal groups. Organ-
ized crime is not ethnic-specific. Members of all ethnic groups
participate.46 Indeed, the most powerful groups today may well be
Nostra, a secret national organization engaged in a wide range of racketeering activities,
including murder, extortion, gambling and loan sharking"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206
(1983); see also HOWARD BLUM, GANGLAND: How THE FBI BROKE TiE MOB (1993)
(story of Gotti investigations and successful trial under RICO); Ralph Blumenthal, Fore-
word to THE Gori TAPES (1992) (transcripts of Gotti surveillance).
44. 1967 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 193-95; PRESIDENT'S COMNMSSION
ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE IMPACr. ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 33-58 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter 1986 PEsIDETl'S REPORT]; HUMBERT S. NELL, THE BusiNEss OF CRIME: ITALIANS
AND SYNDICATE CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (1976) (best history of organized crime).
45. 1967 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 193.
46. Concern that identification of the ethnic character of the dominant group in or-
ganized crime casts unfair reflection on Italian-Americans generally is misplaced, though it
is immediately acknowledged that our society sadly and freely indulges in ethnic stereotyp-
ing, including crime jokes, about Italian-Americans that would be socially unacceptable if
engaged in reference to Blacks, Jews, or other ethnic groups. Ralph Salerno, one of the
nation's outstanding experts on organized crime, eloquently refuted the idea. When an
Italian-American racketeer complained to him, "Why does it have to be one of your own
kind that hurts you?"-Salerno answered:
I'm not your kind and you're not my kind. My manners, morals and mores
are not yours. The only thing we have in common is that we both spring from an
Italian heritage and culture-and you are the traitor to that heritage and culture
which I am proud to be part of.
1967 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 192-93.
The identification, however, does present real dangers. Finding that the "racketeers"
are "foreigners," the nation runs the risk of "scapegoatism." The tendency is to blame the
problem on others. The "culture is not only relieved of sin but [it] can indulge itself in an
orgy of righteous indignation." Gus Tyler, The Roots of Organized Crime, 8 CR1ME &
DELINQuENCY 325,334 (1962). The immigrant may have brought the Mafia with him, but
to have survived and prospered, it must have found fertile soil here. More than nomencla-
ture is involved in the change of the name of the group from "Mafia" to "La Cosa Nostra."
1967 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 192; Anderson, From Mafia to Cosa Nostra,
71 Am. J. OF Soc. 302 (1965). The nation runs the risk, too, of blithely assuming that as
soon as the acculturation process has been completed, the problem will disappear. See,
e.g., Dunniel Bell, Crime as an American Way of Life, in THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE
EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL IDEAS IN =u FIFTIES 127-50 (Collier ed., 2d rev. 1962). The
idea is attractive; it calls for no action on the nation's part; it finds no fault in its present
way of life. Unfortunately, it has shown little signs of happening. Finally, the tendency to
identify organized crime with the Italian-American makes the nation blind to the opera-
tions of those of other ethnic derivations, which are considerable. See 1986 PRESIDENT'S
REPORT, supra note 44, at 81-94 (reporting activities of Chinese Triads and Tongs); 95-97
(Vietnamese gangs); 97-103 (the Japanese Yakuza); 104-17 (the Cuban Marielitos); 117-18
(Columbian groups); 118-21 (Irish groups); 121-25 (Russian groups) and 125-28 (Canadian
groups).
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Hispanic, not Italian or Sicilian.47 If academics debate its existence,
others, particularly liberals, feel organized crime only "services" our
moral failings. It is not really crime; the nation ought to decriminalize
it.48 Touched by its corruption, political leaders also minimize its sig-
47. See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMMISSION, ORGANIZED CRIME IN PENN-
SYLVANIA: A DECADE OF CHANGE 249-90 (1990). The Commission concluded:
In comparison to other ethnic groups, Hispanic organized crime achieved al-
most exponential expansion during the 1980s, and commanded a prominent posi-
tion in the drug trade within the Commonwealth. The decade witnessed a
proliferation in the number and ethnic diversity of Hispanic organized crime
groups, a shift to narcotics trafficking as the dominant activity, and an expansion
of their influence beyond the Hispanic community. The same factors underlying
the increased threat from Hispanic organized crime during the 1980s will influ-
ence trends of the 1990s.
The effectiveness of Hispanic organized crime groups in today's U.S. envi-
ronment may be reflective of the narcotics boom, but also it reflects their en-
trepreneurial ability to move assets out of the United States and, therefore, out of
danger of forfeiture to U.S. law enforcement. So long as they control the source
of a major drug used worldwide, and can launder the proceeds of that traffic in an
effective manner, the Hispanics will retain prominence in the criminal
community.
Id at 289-90. See also 1986 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 44, at 104-18.
48. The classic statement of this perspective-reflected in comments during this Sym-
posium-was penned by Walter Lippman in 1931. Lippman observed:
The underworld is what it is largely because Americans are too moral to
tolerate human weakness, and because they are too great lovers of liberty to tol-
erate the tyranny which might make it possible to abolish what they prohibit.
They have made laws which act like a protective tariff-to encourage the business
of the underworld. Their prohibitions have turned over to the underworld the
services from which it profits. Their prejudice in favor of weak governments has
deprived them of the power to cope with the vast lawbreaking industries which
their laws have called into being.
The dangers and inconveniences of this result are multiplying and have be-
come ominous. The present deadlock between our legislative purposes and our
administrative prejudices cannot continue forever. For while it lasts, lawlessness
is growing, and in certain areas of the country the social structure is already badly
shaken. Something will have to give way. Sooner or later the American people
will have to make up their minds either to bring their legislative ideals down to
the point where they square with prevailing human nature or they will have to
establish an administrative despotism strong enough to begin enforcing their
moral ideals. They cannot much longer defy the devil with a wooden sword.
Walter Lippman, The Underworld as Servant, in Gus TYLER, ORGANIZED CRIME IN
AMERICA: A BOOK OF READINGS 68-69 (1962). The debate continues. For two perceptive
pieces, compare Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public
Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2593 (1994) (reviewing STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS,
AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS
(1994)) with Jacobs, Imagining Drug Legalization, 101 PUB. INTEREST 28 (1990). Jacobs's
conclusion, however, is compelling:
Advocates of drug legalization in effect are urging the country to engage in a
massive experiment. Incredibly, their hypothesis is that by legalizing all drugs
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nificance. Yet thoughtful people see it as a threat. The organized
crime groups of whatever ethnic character that plunder our people are
more than mere criminal cartels. They are also para-governments
within our society. They are active in professional gambling, the im-
portation and distribution of narcotics, and loan sharking. Each of
these offenses is parasitic, corruptive, and predatory in character,
whose chief impact is on the urban, poor and lower middle classes.
Indeed, the economic price tag of organized crime may be higher than
all other crime combined.49 Clearly, too, organized crime affects
and reducing their cost, the drug problem will decline if not wither away. This
defies everything we know about markets, deterrence, and the propensity of peo-
ple-especially Americans-to seek chemical solutions to life's real or imagined
problems and challenges. Moreover, if the legalization movement's hypothesis
proves wrong it will be too late to go back to the status quo ante. Returning to
prohibition after a period in which millions of consumers developed a taste for
new drugs would be a daunting challenge to say the least.
Given the extraordinary risks of such an experiment, and the fact that no
other country in the world has sought to try it, one might have expected many
people who today proclaim themselves to be "for legalization" to have demanded
to know just what is meant by legalization, how it would work, and how it would
affect key institutions of American society. Those questions are being asked all
too infrequently. The legalization debate continues to be waged at an abstract
and simplistic level. Perhaps the most important negative effect of this current
debate is that it is diverting time, resources, and attention from the more pressing
question of how to reform the war on drugs so as to reduce drug use more effec-
tively, and to minimize social and economic costs while preserving civil liberties.
Id. at 41-42 (footnotes omitted). Nothing said in this Symposium leads inescapably to a
different conclusion.
49. 1967 PiRswENT's REPORT, supra note 16, at 33, concluded that the economic
scope of dealing in illegal goods and service was twice that of all other forms of crime. The
estimate may be high. See ABT Assocs., UNREPORTED TAXABLE INCOME FROM SE-
LEcrED ILLEGAL AcrrvrnEs 61, 108, 147 (1984) (estimating that the unreported taxable
income in 1982 relating to drugs is $22.15 billion, to gambling is $2.39 billion, and to prosti-
tution is $11.558 billion); Sima Fishman et al., The Income of Organized Crime in 1986
PRESIDEr's REPORT, supra note 44, at 423 (gross revenue for 1986: $65.7 billion (lower
limit $41.6; upper limit $106.2) with a net income of $46.6 billion (lower limit $29.5; upper
limit $75.3)).
More recent estimates of the drug traffic, however, remain high. The Office of Na-
tional Drug Control Policy estimates that in 1990 the nation's consumers spent:
$18 billion for cocaine
$12 billion for heroin
$ 9 billion for marijuana, and
$ 2 billion for other drugs.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUGS, CRIME, AND THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 36 (1992) [hereinafter DRUGS 1992]. These figures, too, are in substantial dispute.
Peuter, The (Continued) Vitality of Mythical Numbers, 75 PUB. INTEREST 135 (1984). On
drug traffic and organized crime, see PREsmNr's CoMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME,
AMERICA'S HABIT. DRUG ABUSE, DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ORGANIZED CRIME (1986).
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street crime.50 A high percentage of theft, robbery, and burglary in
large cities is related to the need to acquire money for drugs.51 But
organized crime groups have not confined their activities to traditional
criminal endeavors such as the marketing of narcotics. They have in-
creasingly undertaken to subvert legitimate businesses and unions.52
The viability of some spheres of our economic life is threatened.
More important, these criminals have in many places established cor-
rupt alliances with the police, the prosecutors, the courts, and the leg-
islators. Freedom from legal accountability is secured, often under the
rhetoric of liberty. In many ways, organized crime is thus the most
sinister kind of crime in America. It subverts the character of Ameri-
can institutions as well as the character of its individuals.5 3
Obviously, this short review of the facts of antisocial behavior has
not spoken about the international aspects of organized crime or even
attempted to classify-or not classify-"terrorism" as a form of or-
ganized crime. More about these questions later, but it is time to turn
now to our society's response to antisocial behavior.
111. Systems of Criminal Justice
To understand the weaknesses and strengths of our systems of
criminal justice in our society today, we must first appreciate the
problems of the administration of justice in a largely stable, homoge-
nous, pioneer, agricultural community during the first half of the nine-
teenth century; it is then necessary to understand the problems of the
50. DRUGS 1992, supra note 49, at 2-4.
51. Id. at 2.
52. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE EDGE: OR-
GANIZED CRIME, BUSINESS AND LABOR UNIONS (1986); NEW YORK STATE ORGANIZED
CRIME TASK FORCE, CORRUPTION AND RACKETEERING IN THE NEW YORK CITY CON-
STRUCTION INDUSTRY (1990).
53. See 1967 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 209:
[I]n many ways organized crime is the most sinister kind of crime in America.
The men who control it have become rich and powerful by encouraging the needy
to gamble, by luring the troubled to destroy themselves with drugs, by extorting
the profits of honest and hardworking businessmen, by collecting usury from
those in financial plight, by maiming or murdering those who oppose them, by
bribing those who are sworn to destroy them. Organized crime is not merely a
few preying upon a few. In a very real sense it is dedicated to subverting not only
American institutions, but the very decency and integrity that are the most cher-
ished attributes of a free society. As the leaders of Cosa Nostra and their racke-
teering allies pursue their conspiracy unmolested, in open and continuous
defiance of the law, they preach a sermon that all too many Americans heed: The
government is for sale; lawlessness is the road to wealth; honesty is a pitfall and
morality a trap for suckers.
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administration of justice in our mobile, heterogeneous, urban, indus-
trial communities of today and the resulting difficulties involved in
meeting those problems with legal doctrines and social institutions in-
herited from England and then adapted to an American society in the
last century.54
A. Law Enforcement Agencies
We inherited from England a medieval system of sheriffs, coro-
ners, and constables, devised for a rural society and fashioned out of
the struggle between the Crown and Parliament for political and reli-
gious freedom in the seventeenth century. A professional police force
was then unknown; its emergence, too, was slow. Not until 1844, in
fact, was a unified night and day police force established in this coun-
try, first in New York City.55 Its primary function was street patrol.
Nearly one-half of the personnel of every city department are primar-
54. See generally POUND, supra note 8, at 77-166; RoscoE POUND, 3 CRIMINAL Jus-
TICE rN THE AmERicAN Crry: A SumMARY (1922); 1967 PRESmENTS REPORT, supra note
16, at 7-12; PRESIDENr's COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADIN. OF JusTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT-. Tim POLicE 5-7 (1967) [hereinafter THE PoLiCE]; David H. Bayley, Po-
lice: History, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CEAEi AND JusrnCE, supra note 8, at 1119.
55. In a simpler society, common-law offenses normally occurred between neighbors.
No specialized law enforcement system was necessary to bring them into the administra-
tion of justice. THE POLICE, supra note 54, at 1-2 put it this way:.
In the preindustrial age, village societies were closely integrated. Everyone
knew everyone else's affairs and character; the laws and rules of society were
generally familiar and were identical with the moral and ethical precepts taught
by parents, schoolmasters, and the church. If not by the clergy and the village
elders, the peace was kept, more or less informally, by law magistrates (usually
local squires) and constables. These in the beginning were merely the magis-
trates' agents, literally "citizens on duty"-the ablebodied men of the community
serving in turn. Not until the 19th Century did policing even have a distinct
name. Until then it would have been largely impossible to distinguish between
informal peacekeeping and the formal system of law enforcement and criminal
justice. The real outlaws-murderers, highwaymen and their ilk-were handled
mostly by the military when normal procedures for crime control were
unsuccessful.
This is, of course, not true today. For example, the 1967 PRESIDEN''s REPORT, supra
note 16, at 247-48, analyzed 1,905 crimes reported during January of 1966 in Los Angeles.
Only 25% resulted in arrests or other clearance. But 90% of those cleared through arrest
were cleared by arrest made by the patrol force. Of the cleared cases, 63% involved
"named suspects." Of these, about half involved suspects known to the victim, about 30%
were on-the-scene arrests by patrol officers, and about 20% were similar arrests by private
security officers. Most of the cases cleared with unknown suspects were cleared because of
an on-the-scene arrest, initiated either by radio call or field observation. Nevertheless,
88% of the cases not involving named suspects were not cleared. Anonymity, so character-
istic of urban life today, is thus seen to be one of the best shields against detection for the
commission of a crime.
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fly involved in street duty.56 The rest back up those on patrol by per-
forming detective work and working in staff positions. Police work, in
short, has changed comparatively little since 1844.57
Popular fiction notwithstanding, scientific crime detection is still a
limited tool in most police work. The radio and the automobile have
had a greater impact on day-to-day law enforcement than the best the
modern crime laboratory has had to offer, including the sort of DNA
evidence that captures the imagination of those watching a prosecu-
tion that is taking place not too far south of here. 58 Police work today,
56. In 1993 the nation's law enforcement community employed an average of 2.3 full-
time officers for every 1,000 inhabitants. Considering full-time civilians, the overall law
enforcement employee rate was 3.1 per 1,000 inhabitants, including 13,041 separate city,
county, and state police agencies that report data to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
These agencies collectively offered law enforcement service to a population of over 244
million, employing 553,773 officers and 212,353 civilians.
Varying demographic and other jurisdictional characteristics greatly affect the require-
ments for law enforcement service from one locale to another. The needs of a community
having a highly mobile or seasonal population, for example, may be very different from
those of a city whose population is relatively stable. Similarly, a small community situated
between two large cities may require a greater number of law enforcement personnel than
a community of a similar size that has no urban centers nearby. The functions of law
enforcement are also significantly diverse throughout the nation. In certain areas, sheriffs'
responsibilities are limited almost exclusively to civil functions and the administration of
the county jail facilities. Similarly, the responsibilities of state police and highway patrol
agencies vary from one jurisdiction to another.
The law enforcement employee average for all cities nationwide in 1993 was 2.8 per
1,000 inhabitants. The nation's smallest cities, those with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants,
employed an average of 3.5 employees per 1,000 population, while for the largest cities
(over 250,000 population) the rate was 3.6 per 1,000. Cities with populations between
10,000 and 249,999 registered lesser rates ranging from 2.2 to 2.4 employees per 1,000 in-
habitants. Rural and suburban counties averaged full-time law enforcement employee
rates of 3.9 and 3.6 per 1,000 inhabitants. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1993, supra note 27,
at 288.
Local governments (county and municipal) spent $23,080,597 in 1990 for police pro-
tection, 72.5% of the total of federal, state, and local expenditures, while state govern-
ments spent $4,714,460 in 1990 in direct police protection, 14.8% of the total of federal,
state and local expenditures. SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5, tbls. 1.1. 1.2.
57. When the patrol force fails to prevent a crime or to apprehend the offender during
its commission, the police must rely instead upon investigation: the detective function,
development of which was slow. It was not, for example, until 1842, thirteen years after
the formation of the Metropolitan Police in England, that a small body was detached for
detective work, and not until 1878 that the Criminal Investigation Department was for-
mally created. PATRICK BARRON DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 18
(1959).
58. 1967 PRESIDENTr's REPORT, supra note 16, at 97 ("crime detection, popular fiction
to the contrary notwithstanding, at present is a limited tool"); Gina Kolata, Two Chief
Rivals in the Battle over DNA Evidence Now Agree on Its Use, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1994, at




however, is still largely looking, questioning, and listening-even
under the best of conditions and in the best of departments.
(1) Local Police
The general performance-effectiveness or fairness-of the local
police is hardly impressive. Putting aside the question of community
relations-too many times nonexistent-the clearance rate by arrest
as opposed to conviction of crimes against either the person or the
property is hardly high.5 9 Sadly, recall that the perpetrator is known
to the victim in many crimes of violence. Under present law enforce-
ment practices, the clearance statistics demonstrate, in short, that
often crime does pay.
The truth is that the nation's local police officers, despite some
important advances, largely remain poorly paid, undertrained, and
overworked. Professionalization is only just beginning. All too often,
politics, if not corruption, taints their work. The experts agree that
too few departments are well organized.60 A need is present for area-
wide planning and statewide coordination, but local law enforcement
remains largely fragmented, complicated, and frequently overlapping.
America remains in too many places too often a nation of obsolete,
small police forces. It has often been demonstrated that much could
be done merely with more adequate personnel. The needs of local
law enforcement, in short, are massive.
(2) State Police6'
As the state's chief executive, the governor of most states must
see to it that the laws of the state are enforced. The governor, too, is
usually the head of the National Guard, which backs up police agen-
cies in civil disturbances. Traditionally, the state attorney general,
however, is the state's chief law enforcement officer. In this capacity,
he or she generally has at least legal supervisory power over law en-
forcement in the state. But statewide police forces, now found in a
majority of states and in all of the populous states, save California, are
a comparatively new development. The state police force was first set
up in Pennsylvania in 1905, principally because local county sheriffs or
59. UNIOgm CRME REPORT 1993, supra note 27, fig. 3.1 (murder, 66%; aggravated
assault, 56%; forcible rape, 53%; robbery, 24%; burglary, 13%; larceny, 20%; motor vehi-
cle theft, 14%).
60. See generally Herman Goldstein, Police: Administration, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRnInm AND Jus=rcn, supra note 8, at 1125.
61. See generally Robert Borkenstein, Police: State Police, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CnmiAND JusTncE, supra note 8, at 1131.
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constables-institutions, with a few notable exceptions, now anachro-
nistic-were unwilling or unable to enforce the law. Today the state
police are the fastest growing of the police agencies. From the begin-
ning, they have been characterized by a high degree of professional-
ism, largely free of corruption, and not dominated by politics.
Usually, it is their job to train local officers, maintain statewide labo-
ratories, keep statewide intelligence and other files, and otherwise
back up local forces. In many ways, their contribution to state law
enforcement is the hope of the future.
(3) Federal Law Enforcement62
Unlike the states, the federal government has no common-law ju-
risdiction in the area of criminal justice.63 Like Topsy, in Uncle Tom's
Cabin, the federal police agencies have "just growed." In 1789 the
Revenue Cutter Service was started. Since then, innumerable differ-
ent agencies have been established. Located in various departments
of the federal government, the chief agencies are, among others, the
Secret Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Internal
Revenue Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 64
Although small in numbers-New York City has more than half as
many police officers as the entire federal establishment 65-the impact
of the federal agencies on criminal justice-federal, state, and local-
is great.
While the attention of state and local agencies has been primarily
directed at street crime, a major share of the burden of responding to
white collar and organized crime has fallen to the federal government.
Evaluation of the federal effort, however, is difficult because so few
objective measures are available. The progress that is being made
may be attributed in part to the enactment of the Organized Crime
62. See generally ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 5; Richard E. Morgan, Federal
Bureau of Investigation: History, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note
8, at 768; Mark F. Pomerantz, Prosecution: United States Attorney, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND JUsTICE, supra note 8, at 1290; Ronald Goldstock, The Prosecutor As Problem
Solver, in OCCASIONAL PAPERS FROM THE CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN CRIME AND
JUSTICE, NEw YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (1991).
63. United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816); United States v. Hudson
& Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33-34 (1812).
64. In 1990 the federal government spent $4,020,474 in direct expenditures for police
protection, 12.6% of the total of federal, state, and local expenditures. SOURCEBOOK 1993,
supra note 5, tbls. 1.1, 1.2. The federal government in 1990 employed 65,490 persons in
police protection. Id. tbl. 1.23.
65. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS 1990 tbl. 72 (New York City: total-36,407 (26,842, total officers; 9563, total
civilians)).
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Control Act of 1970, which gave federal agencies some of the legal
tools they needed to act effectively against group crime.66 The failure
66. In 1970 Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act. 84 Stat. 922. The
Act originated in recommendations of the 1967 PRESIDENT's REPORT, supra note 16, at
208, which in turn, were based, in part, on G. Robert Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence
Gathering Process in Organized Crime Cases: A Preliminary Analysis, in PRsiDENT's
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGAN-
IZED CRnM 80 (1967). Three assumptions underwrote these recommendations: the prob-
lem of organized crime was finite, principally domestic, and its participants were amenable
to law enforcement, assumptions that are increasingly not applicable to contemporary
problems, including the international organized crime, the international traffic in drugs,
and terrorism. The need for new thinking in these areas is manifest. The 1970 Act was
enacted "to strengthen [ ] the legal tools in the evidence gathering process.... [to] estab-
lish. . . new penal prohibitions, and [to] provide ... enhanced sanctions and new reme-
dies." 84 Stat. 923. Title IX of the 1970 Act is known as the "Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act" (RICO) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et. seq.). See generally
G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980); G.
Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context Reflection on Bennett v. Berg, 68
NOTRE DAME L. Rnv. 237 (1982) [hereinafter Blakey, Civil Action]; G. Robert Blakey &
Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO, 62 NOTRE DAME L. Ruv. 526 (1987);
G. Robert Blakey, RICO and the Various Proposals For Reform "Mother of God-Is This
the End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L. Rnv. 851, 882-87 (1990) [hereinafter Blakey, Myths].
RICO covers violence, the provision of illegal goods and services, corruption in labor
or management relations, corruption in government, and criminal fraud. Blakey, CivilAc-
tion, supra, at 300-06. Congress found that "the sanctions and remedies available" under
the law in 1970 were "unnecessarily limited in scope and impact." Id. It then provided a
wide range of new criminal and civil sanctions to control these offenses, including impris-
onment, forfeiture, injunctions, and treble damage relief for "person[s] injured" in their
"business or property" by violations of the statute. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1964(c) (1984 &
Supp. 1995). At the time, these sanctions were called for by no less than President Nixon,
Message on Organized Crime, reprinted in Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Crimi-
nal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 449 (1969)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings], and the American Bar Association. Hearings Before Sub-
committee No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 537 (1970);
Senate Hearings, supra, at 259.
At first, the Department of Justice moved slowly to use RICO criminally. Today, it is
the prosecutor's tool of choice in sophisticated forms of crime. Oversight on Civil RICO
Suits, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 109-11
(1985) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Stephen S. Trott). The Department of
Justice is also moving to implement the civil provisions. Id. at 116-17 (litigation against
mob-controlled unions reviewed). Since 1970 criminal RICO has been effectively used
against organized crime groups, United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 1989)
("The RICO enterprise alleged in the indictment is an organization known as the 'commis-
sion' of La Cosa Nostra, a nationwide criminal society which operates through local organi-
zations known as 'families."'); compare Selwyn Raab, Curbing Mob Chiefs, N.Y. TrmEs,
Feb. 27, 1984, at B2 (indictment under RICO of nine mob leaders, five of whom sit on the
"commission" and are the heads of the New York City area families) with S. REP. No. 617,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36-43 (1969) (five of nine individuals indicted in 1984 identified in
1969 in Senate Hearings, supra), white-collar crime prosecutions, United States v. Maru-
beni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980) and violent groups, United States v.
Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1526-28, 1540, 1546 (9th Cir. 1988) (prosecution of "Order" or
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"Bruders Schweigh," white-hate group for robbery, murder, etc. (Alan Berg)), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 171 (1989). See also United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785 (2d Cir. 1994) (street gang
engaging in murder, robbery, and extortion); STEPHEN SINGULAR, TALKED TO DEATH:
THE MURDER OF ALAN BERG AND THE RISE OF THE NEo-NAZIS (Berkley ed., 1989);
James C. McKinley, Jr., Accounts of Calculated Cruelty in a Bronx Gang, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
10, 1995, at B3; Matthew Purdy, Using the Racketeering Law to Bring Down Street Gangs,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1994, at Al.
Nevertheless, RICO is under attack by a wide range of groups. Criminally, the princi-
pal focus of the attack is on large trials. The Report of the National Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers on the "RICO Megatrial" is illustrative. NATIONAL ASS'N OF CRIM.
DEFENSE LAWS., REPORT ON RICO MEGATRIALS (1987) [hereafter NACDL REPORT].
See also ABA CRIM. JUSTICE SECTION ON RICO TRIALS, DRAFT REPORT (1988); COMMIT-
TEE ON CRIM. ADVOCACY OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MEGA-
TRIALS: A REPORT (1988). Compare United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) (Weinstein, C.J.) (criticizing a RICO indictment of a substantial number of defend-
ant indictments) with United States v. Casamente, 887 F.2d 1141, 1151-52 (2d Cir. 1989)
(convictions upheld of 21 defendants tried over 17 months for RICO drugs and setting
standards for complex trials: (1) prosecutor must make a good faith estimate of antici-
pated length of the case-in-chief, (2) if the trial will exceed four months, the prosecutor
must justify it, and (3) such a trial of more than ten defendants must be especially justi-
fied), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138 (1990). The NACDL REPORT, supra, which cites only 27
allegedly illustrative decisions, is analyzed and rejected, point by point, using a computer-
generated study of all 900 decisions handed down during the period of the Report, in G.
Robert Blakey, RICO: The Federal Experience (Criminal and Civil) and an Analysis of
Attacks Against the State, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES
457-467 (Robert J. Kelly et al. eds., 1994). Independent studies conclude that RICO is
effective against sophisticated forms of crime. The President's Commission on Organized
Crime had high praise for RICO and recommended that states adopt similar legislation.
1986 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 44, at 133-34 (concluding that RICO is one of the
most powerful and effective weapons in existence for fighting organized crime). In its
study of federal organized crime prosecutions, the General Accounting Office also
concluded:
Prior to the passage of [RICO], attacking an organized criminal group was an
awkward affair. RICO facilitates the prosecution of a criminal group involved in
superficially unrelated criminal ventures and enterprises connected only at the
usually well-insulated upper levels of the organization's bureaucracy.
Before the act, the government's efforts were necessarily piecemeal, attack-
ing isolated segments of the organization as they engaged in single criminal acts.
The leaders, when caught, were only penalized for what seemed to be unimpor-
tant crimes. The larger meaning of these crimes was lost because the big picture
could not be presented in a single criminal prosecution. With the passage of
RICO, the entire picture of the organization's criminal behavior and the involve-
ment of its leaders in directing that behavior could be captured and presented.
Organized Crime: 25 Years After Valachi: Hearing Before the Senate Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigations of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1988)
(testimony of David C. Williams, Director of Special Investigations, General Accounting
Office). Based on its hearings, the Senate Committee recommended that federal law en-
forcement agencies "should continue, in appropriate and deserving cases, their innovative
and effective use of the enterprise theory of investigation, the task force approach, and the
provisions of the RICO statute." SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF
THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S USE OF THE RICO
STATUTE AND OTHER EFFORTS AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME, S. REP. No. 407, 101st
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Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1990). Finally, the New York Times, in a special report, "The Mob in
Decline," discussed RICO's utility in the fight against organized crime:
Law-enforcement officials generally credit a long-term strategy adopted by
the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the early
1980's: developing cases against the top leaders of organized-crime families and
relying largely on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or
RICO, as a courtroom tool.
By concentrating on enterprises rather than individuals, Federal prosecutors
in the last five years have removed the high commands of families through the
convictions and long prison sentences of almost 100 top Cosa Nostra leaders.
Selwyn Raab, A Battered and Ailing Mafia Is Losing Its Grip on America, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 1990, at Al. See also Robert D. McFadden, The Mafia of 1980's: Divided and Under
Siege, N.Y. Tams, Mar. 11, 1987, at Al; Stewart Panell et al., Busting the Mob, U.S. NEws
& WoRLD REP., Feb. 3, 1986, at 24. The mob itself agrees. United States v. Cintolo, 818
F.2d 980,984-95 (1st Cir. 1987) (La Cosa Nostra boss Gennaro Angiulo overhead on a bug-
"Under RICO, no matter who.., we are, if we're together, they'll get every... one of
us."); see GERALD O'NEILL & DICK LEHR, Tim UNDERBoss: Tm RISE AND FALL OF A
MAIA FAMIY (1989).
The most thoughtful, thorough, and independent academic study is JAMES B. JACOBS,
BUSTING THE MOB (1994). Jacobs concludes:I
[S]ome law enforcement officials and academic observers predict[ .. .] that
America [is] on the threshold of defeating Cosa Nostra. While one cannot help
being impressed by the government's overwhelming successes in organized-crime
prosecutions across the United States since 1980, one must also be impressed by
Cosa Nostra's power and expansive reach as evidenced in the testimony, wiretaps,
and physical evidence that have been adduced ... [in the current] trials. It is
sobering to consider that, at least until recently, Cosa Nostra exerted powerful
influence over the nation's largest union (the Teamsters), several other important
national unions (Longshoreman's Association, Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees International Union, and the Laborers International Union of North
America), the New York City/New Jersey waterfront, the Fulton Fish Market, the
New York City construction industry, garment industry, and trash-hauling indus-
try, and numerous other businesses throughout the country. Over the last several
decades, Cosa Nostra leaders have stood at the side of mayors, governors, and
even presidents. The sum total of this much influence and power makes organ-
ized crime a significant part of the political economy of the United States.
Unfortunately, there is no systematic way to determine how successful the
government's organized-crime-control campaign has been, much less will be, in
weakening or eliminating Cosa Nostra or in reducing the amount of racketeering
and harm associated with Cosa Nostra. There are no systematic and reliable data
on the health, wealth and power of Cosa Nostra as a whole or of its individual
crime families. Hundreds of Cosa Nostra members have been sentenced to long
prison terms, but we do not know whether replacements have or will move into
their vacated roles. Many law enforcement professionals see the Cosa Nostra
families as being in disarray and in permanent decline. But these observations
are generally ad hoc and not part of systematic nationwide intelligence gathering
and analysis effort. Electronic monitoring, computer systems, and the emergence
of well-trained organized crime-control units and specialists make conceivable the
implementation of an extensive intelligence operation. But resources and tech-
nology have to be supported by political will and organizational commitment.
The danger is that attention will be drawn away from organized-crime control to
other pressing law enforcement priorities and that, while the law enforcement
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to do more is attributed to a failure to secure legally admissible evi-
dence or to commit to the fight more resources, 67 and organized
crime's willingness to threaten, bribe, and murder those who would
testify against its members.68
machinery sleeps, Cosa Nostra will reconstitute itself. Finally, even if Cosa Nos-
tra as an organization has been substantially weakened, we obviously cannot be
sure that Cosa Nostra's racketeering activities have not been (or will not be)
taken over by newly emerging crime groups, thereby negating any reduction in
racketeering or societal harm.
Many of the economic and social forces that allowed organized crime to
achieve such immense power are still operative. The citizenry's demand for illicit
goods and services remains strong. Many unions remain vulnerable to labor rack-
eteering, and those that have been "liberated" from organized crime have been
very slow to repudiate their mob ties, if they have done so at all. Thus, it may be
premature to predict that the investigations and trials of the 1980s constitute the
beginning of the last chapter in the history of Cosa Nostra. Whatever the future
may hold, the period from the late 1970s to the early 1990s has been marked by
the most concerted and sophisticated attack on organized crime in the history of
the Untied States.
Id. at 23-24.
The Organized Crime Control Act contained more than RICO. Title II authorized the
general use of immunity techniques. 84 Stat. 926 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 6001 et seq.)
Since 1973 an average of 4,287 orders have been obtained each year. SOURCEBOOK 1993,
supra note 5, tbl. 5.1. Title V initiated the witness protection program. Since 1987 the
program has protected 13,535 witnesses. Id. tbl. 1.56. Salvatore Gravano, the underboss in
the John Gotti Family of La Cosa Nostra, is one of the most significant protected witnesses
in the history of the program. See Joseph P. Fried, Ex Mob Underboss Gets Lenient Terms
for Help as Witness, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 27, 1994, at Al (reporting a sentence of five years by
Judge I. Leo Glasser despite his admission of involvement in nineteen murders for "invalu-
able aid" in Mafia prosecutions). Criminal RICO prosecutions are running at about the
rate of 125 per year, 39% of which are in the organized crime area (not Mafia only, but
also drugs, etc.), while 48% are in the white-collar crime area (government corruption,
business fraud, etc.) and 13% are in other areas (violent groups, including terrorist, white-
hate, etc.). Blakey, Myths, supra, at 120. General data on matters, defendants and
sentences in racketeering prosecutions under RICO and related statutes are reported in
SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5, tbls. 5.38, 5.39, 5.40, 5.41. Civil RICO filings are running
at the rate of around 1,000 per year. Since 1988, though after 1989, the year of H.J., Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), the Supreme Court's "pattern deci-
sion," the number dropped 7.7% from 1991 to 1992. U.S. COURTS 1992, supra note 5, tbl.
C-A2 (230,503 total filings, of which .389% were RICO (897)). Estimates indicated that
58.6% of the civil filings would be in the federal courts on an independent basis of jurisdic-
tion. Blakey & Cessar, supra, at 619.
67. In the white-collar area, the work of the Department of Justice that is the most
impressive is its political corruption prosecutions. A Vice President and a Supreme Court
Justice have had to resign; Senators and congressmen have been convicted as have attor-
neys general and other cabinet level appointees; at the state and local level, mayors, judges,
prosecutors, sheriffs, and police officers have all been convicted. Between 1970 and 1991,
the Department convicted 14,093 individuals (41% federal; 7.2% state; 24.1% local; 27.1%
other). SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5, at tbl. 5.98.
68. See generally Witness Intimidation Called a Growing Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
1994, § 1, at 30 (quoting Rep. Charles E. Schumer, "When thugs control the courthouse,
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The need for such modem evidence-gathering techniques as
court-ordered electronic surveillance, which was provided for in Title
Il of the 1968 Safe Streets Act, moreover, is established, yet not
everywhere adopted, or if adopted, vigorously used.69 While results
are good so far, much remains to be done.
they control the law. They control the streets."). For general statistics on the witness pro-
tection program, see SOURCEB3OOK 1993, supra note 5, tbl. 1.56 (number of new witnesses
increased from 170 in 1987 to 227 in 1992).
69. The 1967 PRESIDENT's REPORT, supra note 16, at 192, identified the 17 states in
which the wealthiest and most influential core group of "organized crime operated"; it then
recommended the adoption of electronic surveillance legislation as part of a comprehen-
sive law enforcement strategy to curtail organized crime. Id. at 203. Congress enacted the
legislation in 1968. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.).
Congress also created a commission to study the first six years of operation of the statute.
Id. at 225. Although not without dissent, the NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF
FED. & STATE LAw, REPORT RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEIL-
LANCE 3-5 (1976) concluded:
The considerations which led Congress to provide procedures for court au-
thorization of electronic surveillance for law enforcement are still applicable. The
Commission vigorously reaffirms the findings and statements of policy made by
Congress in 1968 that
Organized criminals make extensive use of wire and oral communications in
their criminal activities. The interception of such communications to obtain evi-
dence of the commission of crimes or to prevent their commission is an indispen-
sable aid to law enforcement and the administration of justice.
Court-authorized electronic surveillance under Title I has effectively as-
sisted law enforcement in investigations of organized-crime-type offenses, includ-
ing narcotics distribution, major fraud schemes, and other similar activity of an
ongoing conspiratorial nature. Alternate investigative techniques were fre-
quently ineffective in combatting these type of criminal activity.
Law enforcement would be more extensively in criminal investigations of
substantial significance to the public interest, particularly in the investigation of
narcotics importation and distribution and theft and fencing. If there is to be a
Federal role in the investigation of interstate theft and fencing crimes, customs
offenses, and manufacture, sale, and distribution of firearms, electronic surveil-
lance would be a highly useful tool.
The 1986 PREsDENT's REPORT, supra note 44, at 145, concurred ("Electronic surveillance
is now an accepted law enforcement technique that has proven its effectiveness is organ-
ized crime investigations."). But see SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5, tbl. 2.53 (in 1974,
80% of those questioned disapproved of wiretapping, in 1993, only 72% disapproved;
question does not distinguish between private surveillance and law enforcement use under
court system).
Today, 37 states have authorized the use of electronic surveillance in law enforcement.
ADmInSTRATIVE OFFICE OF Tim U.S. COURTS, WIRETAP REPORT JANuARY 1, 1993 TO
DECEMBER 31, 1993 tbl. 1 (1994). Of the seventeen states identified by the 1967 PRESi-
DENr's REPORT, supra note 16, only one (Michigan) has not enacted the recommended
legislation, but among those states that did, five states (Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, Rhode
Island, and Wisconsin) did not even use their statutes in 1993. Id. Of the seventeen states
that did use the statute, the bulk of the surveillance orders were issued in only four states
(Florida, 36; Maryland, 17; New York, 204; and Pennsylvania, 61). Indeed, 73% of the
state orders were secured in only three states: New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
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B. Courts
It is not possible, of course, to talk about criminal justice without
talking about the courts, both state and federal. Popular fiction and
the media make much of the drama of the criminal trial. It is sup-
posed to be, of course, a contest between the forces of good and evil
from which the truth emerges-established in a process characterized
by a high regard for individual rights. Attention is also focused on the
work of the appellate courts, particularly the Supreme Court. There,
we are told rights are vindicated and justice done. But the reality is
very different.
A substantial portion of all criminal defendants are poor 7O-and
poorly represented at trial. Seldom is a defendant judged by a jury of
his peers-his guilt is usually established as a result of a bargaining
process with the prosecutor, in which the merits of the case are not
always the chief consideration.7' Popular fiction notwithstanding,
criminal justice today is largely administrative, not judicial. When
cases are not resolved by pleas, the conviction rate is not necessarily
impressive.72
In fact, while the federal government secured 450 orders, and while federal orders in-
creased 32%, state orders decreased 9%. Id. at 2. Organized crime-in particular the drug
traffic-must not be as widespread in these states as the earlier studies found. The best
academic piece on electronic surveillance-analytically and functionally-is Goldsmith,
The Supreme Court and Title III Rewriting the Law of Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. C0M.
LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1983).
70. Comprehensive data on poverty in the administration of federal, state, and local
systems of criminal justice are not collected annually. All agree, however, that a substan-
tial portion of those processed by the criminal justice system is indigent. See, e.g., BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND
JUSTICE 75 (2d ed. 1988) ("40% of all defendants charged with felonies are classified as
indigents."). Data on appointment of counsel in the federal courts is collected in U.S.
COURTS 1992, supra note 5, at 78-79 (1992: 82,907 appointments, a 5% increase over
1991.).
71. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR tbl. D-4 (of 46,725 convicted defendants, 3,973 (85%) were convicted by
guilty pleas, 718 (1.8%) were convicted of pleas of nolo contendere, while 1,063 (2.67%)
were convicted by the court, and 5,210 (13%) were convicted by the jury) [hereinafter U.S.
COURTS 1990]; SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5, tbl. 5.57 (selected states: 91% guilty
pleas). Guilty pleas are one method of cutting down on caseloads. Crowding in federal
courts can, however, be caused by a variety of factors beyond legal theory or new legisla-
tion. Even conscientious and able judges can be bad administrators of their dockets. See
Doreen Carvajal, New York's Clogged U.S. Courts Delaying Civil Verdicts for Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at Al (reporting that Judge I. Leo Glasser, a former dean of the
Brooklyn Law School, has 50 civil cases pending longer than 3 years; in one case, a nonjury
trial heard in 1984, the judge has not made a decision yet).
72. See, e.g., U.S. COURTS 1990, supra note 71, at 66 (of 56,519 defendants, 46,735
(82.6%) were convicted; of the 9,794 (12.4%) not convicted, 8,193 (83.6%) were dismissed;
630 (6.4%) were acquitted by the court; and 971 (9.9%) were acquitted by the jury; of the
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Our courts today operate with rules of evidence and criminal pro-
cedure that were fashioned in an age dominated by the death penalty
and fearful of the suppression of religious or political dissent. Law
enforcement was consciously debilitated. Insistence upon the com-
mon-law rights of an Englishman in the latter half of the eighteenth
century-pressed to the limits of their logic in our formative years by
a Puritan and pioneer distrust of all government itself-ultimately
produced a complicated, expensive, and time-consuming process,
which has now largely broken down. The adjudication of guilt or in-
nocence, in short, is at best a matter of chance. A system designed for
the leisurely pace of a rural society is now operating as a mass produc-
tion scythe of the poor and as a means of enabling the better off to
evade legal responsibility. As the course of the O.J. Simpson prosecu-
tion amply demonstrates, it is not race, but wealth that affects its di-
rection. Volume alone makes a mockery of justice.
We experienced in the last several decades, moreover, both a
revolution and a counter-revolution in criminal procedure, led by the
Supreme Court, which has been both good and bad. The elimination
of the violence of the third degree-now largely an accomplished
fact-was a great advance. In 1936, for example, in Brown v. Missis-
sippi,73 the Supreme Court overturned a conviction because it was
based on a confession obtained by physical torture. No other result
was possible. But as the Supreme Court moved on to less clear-cut
issues of "fairness," some of its members sought, in the name of indi-
vidual rights-defined by an eighteenth century ideology-to convert
the criminal trial from a test of the defendant's innocence or guilt into
an inquiry into the propriety of the policeman's conduct. Surely, the
high water mark of that revolution was Escobedo v. Illinois,74 in which
a habitual offender, Danny Escobedo, had his murder conviction
overturned because of an alleged abuse of his "absolute right to re-
main silent."75  Danny was let go free. Subsequently, he was con-
victed of dealing in narcotics, taking indecent liberties with a minor,
and attempted murder.76 Whatever weight ought to be given to
7,874 tried to court or jury; 6,273 (79.6%) were convicted, while 1,602 (20.4%) were acquit-
ted); SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5, tbl. 5.73 (selected states: 64% convicted; 31% not
convicted; 5% deferred or diverted).
73. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
74. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
75. Id. at 485.
76. 'Lucky' Criminal Behind Bars Again... But for How Long?, Cm. TRm., Oct. 22,
1985, at A17 (reporting Escobedo's conviction in 1967 for dealing in narcotics, for which he
served 8 years of a 22-year sentence, and his 1984 conviction for taking indecent liberties
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Danny's "absolute right to remain silent," few ought to argue with the
proposition that too little weight was given to the other, equally im-
portant rights of those to whom Danny sold drugs, whom he sexually
abused, or whom he tried to kill. Fortunately, Escobedo is now in
prison where he belongs.
The revolution in criminal procedure that reached its peak in the
1960s, however, is now at an end. Indeed, the counter-revolution is
well under way. The liberal block no longer dominates the Supreme
Court. President Nixon's unprecedented four appointments in 1969,
voting together roughly seventy percent of the time, managed to turn
the Court around. Statistics tell at least part of the story. During the
last term of the Warren Court (1968-69), the Court heard and decided
twenty-six appeals in criminal cases. The prosecution won only eight,
or thirty-one percent. Sixteen, or sixty-three percent, were reversed.
In contrast, during the first term of the Burger Court (1969-70), the
Court heard and decided twenty-nine appeals in criminal cases. This
time, the prosecution won eighteen, or sixty-two percent. This was a
one hundred percent reversal. The "search and reverse" policy of the
Warren Court is gone. What was begun under Chief Justice Berger
now continues under Chief Justice Rehnquist. Arguably, it may have
gone too far in the other direction.
While we all have sympathy with the goals of the Warren Court-
accurate fact finding, the recognition of human dignity, the preserva-
tion of privacy-it may be rightly questioned whether it is the courts
that should modernize criminal justice. The tool of reversal, the only
one generally available, is much too blunt. Better police training,
higher pay, and attitudes of fair-minded professionalism are needed.
The judiciary cannot provide these. Rather, they must come from leg-
islative and executive action.
C. Corrections
Our criminal justice system must be viewed as an integrated
whole-even if in practice it is not. Any account of the system calls
for a look at corrections, too. On any given day our correctional insti-
tutions are responsible for a staggering number of offenders. 77 Here,
with a 12 year old, for which he was sentenced to 12 years); Linnet Myers, Escobedo Sen-
tenced to 11 Years For Murder Attempt, Cm. TRM., Mar. 5, 1987, at 3 (reporting Escobedo's
guilty plea to attempted murder and sentence to 11 years, 2 months in prison, which oc-
curred while he was appealing his indecent liberties conviction).
77. In 1992, 883,656 prisoners were incarcerated in federal and state institutions.
SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5, tbl. 6.31. 441,889 prisoners, on an average daily popula-
tion, were in jails. Id. tbl. 6.17. Federal institutions held 80,259 prisoners, while state insti-
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too, the central role of the states is evident. All states have prison and
parole systems. Yet "corrections" do not correct. Life in many insti-
tutions is at best barren, at worst unspeakably brutal and degrading.
Most institutions are confronted with serious problems of rackets, vio-
lence, and non-consensual homosexuality. 78 Treatment is aimed at the
imprisoned or supervised offender, while many of the causes of his
crime lie in the outside environment, which is left untouched. Proba-
tion or parole is often a joke. Caseloads of the probation or parole
office are unreasonably high. Although over half of the adult offend-
ers are "supervised," frequently this supervision is limited to ten or
fifteen-minute interviews once or twice a month with an officer carry-
ing over a hundred other cases. Trained officers are few. Parole deci-
sions are often related to little more than institutional capacity-the
necessity to release or parole as many as are imprisoned.
We speak of rehabilitation, yet a majority of those in corrections
work are involved in custody and maintenance. Thirty-seven of our
major state institutions are over one hundred years old.79 Our recidi-
vism statistics, which are inadequate because they depend on catching
an offender an additional time, indicate a measure of our failure.80
tutions held 803,706 prisoners. Id tbl. 6.31. 65,706 of the federal prisoners had sentences
of more than a year, while 781,565 of the state prisoners had sentences of more than one
year. Id. Corrections systems in 1990 cost $24,960,606, of which direct federal costs were
6.3%, direct state costs were 66.9%, and direct local costs were 26.8%. Id. tbl. 1.
78. In 1993, 40 inmates were killed in state institutions, while 3 were killed in federal
institutions; 3,923 assaults that resulted in an injury on staff occurred in state institutions,
while 906 similar assaults occurred in federal institutions; 7,397 assaults that resulted in
injury on other inmates occurred in state institutions, while 823 similar assaults occurred in
federal institutions. Id. tbl. 6.106.
79. In fact, 264 of 1,207 state institutions are under court order to limit population
because of various legally unacceptable prison conditions. Id. tbl. 1.91.
80. Of the 108,580 persons released from prisons in 11 states in 1983, representing
more than half of all released state prisoners that year, an estimated 62.5% were rearrested
for a felony or serious misdemeanor within three years, 46.8% were reconvicted, and
41.4% were returned to prison or jail. Before their release from prison, the prisoners were
arrested and charged with an average of more than 12 offenses each; nearly two-thirds
were arrested at least once in the past for a violent offense; and two-thirds were previously
in jail or prison. By year-end 1986, those prisoners who were rearrested averaged an addi-
tional 4.8 new charges. An estimated 22.7% of all prisoners were rearrested for a violent
offense within three years of their release.
Other findings from the 1983 survey include the following:
-An estimated 68,000 of the released prisoners were rearrested and charged with
more than 326,000 new felonies and serious misdemeanors, including approximately 50,000
violent offenses (of which 17,000 were robberies and 23,000 were assaults), more than
141,000 property offenses (of which 36,000 were burglaries), and 46,000 drug offenses.
-Recidivism rates were highest in the first year; one of four released prisoners was
rearrested in the first six months and two of five within the first year after their release.
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Frequently, too, a progression towards violence is seen. This data,
although partial, sadly documents the existence of persistent or hard
core offenders, who contribute substantially to the overall crime
problem.
D. International Organized Crime
In early June 1994 the upper house of the German legislature
killed a crime bill that stiffened penalties for neo-Nazis.81 The lower
house, controlled by Chancellor Helmut Kohl's conservative coalition,
approved the bill. The upper house was controlled by the opposition
Social Democrats, who especially objected to provisions allowing the
federal intelligence agency to monitor international phone calls on be-
half of federal prosecutors.
When Russia's President Boris N. Yeltsin announced in late June
1994 that he was preparing an urgent decree to reckon with his coun-
try's looming organized crime groups, the nation was jubilant; when
he released the decree a few days later-following a weekend in
which the police tallied nearly a dozen bombings and eight contract
-The more extensive a prisoner's prior arrest record, the higher rate of recidivism;
over 74% of those with 11 or more prior arrests were rearrested, compared to 38% of the
first-time offenders. Prisoners with a greater number of prior arrests were also arrested
more quickly than those with fewer prior arrests. Moreover, regardless of how long prison-
ers stayed away from rearrest following their release, those with longer prior records had
higher rates of rearrest in subsequent time periods than those with shorter records.
-Released prisoners were often rearrested for the same type of crime for which they
had served time in prison; within three years, 31.9% of released burglars were rearrested
for burglary; 24.8% of drug offenders were rearrested for a drug offense; and 19.6% of
robbers were rearrested for robbery.
-Recidivism rates were the highest in the first year. Four of every ten released pris-
oners were rearrested in the first year; nearly one in four was convicted of a new crime;
and nearly one in five was returned to prison or sent to jail.
-Overall, between mid-year 1983 and year-end 1986, prisoners released in 1983 ac-
counted for 2.8% of the Index crime arrests in the 11 states surveyed. By the end of the
first year after release, nearly one in five prisoners was reincarcerated and was not liable
for rearrest, and by the second year, nearly one in three had been returned to prison or jail.
-The new offenses occurred not only in the states in which the prisoners were re-
leased from prison but other states as well. More than one of every eight rearrests were
made in states other than the state in which the prisoner was released. An estimated 5.5%
of the released prisoners were rearrested only in states other than those in which they were
released. An additional 4.7% of the prisoners were rearrested both in their state of release
and in another state.
See generally ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT- RECIDIVISM OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 (1989); Correcting Revolving Door Justice, New Approaches
to Recidivism: Hearings Before House Subcomm. on Crime & Crim. Justice, 103rd Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1995).
81. German Crime Bill Dies, N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 1994, at 6.
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killings in the capital-the reaction was a unanimous avalanche of
outrage, which cut across the political spectrum, an unanimity rare in
Russia these days.8 The outrage focused on those aspects of the de-
cree that suspended some of the country's newest and most basic civil
liberties.
These two events are not unrelated to anyone who studies those
facts that unmistakenly point to an emerging and disturbing alliance
of the world's major organized crime syndicates. They have not yet
coalesced into a global syndicate; rather, they have evolved into a se-
ries of troublesome ventures in drug dealing, arms trafficking, and the
theft of property for its worldwide redistribution.
The relation between the Sicilian Mafia and its American coun-
terpart in organized crime is generally well known. The operations of
Columbian cartels in cocaine trafficking are also common knowledge.
Less well known are international operations of the Chinese Triads,
the Japanese Yakuza, and, most significant, the revitalization of Rus-
sian organized crime, vorovskoy mir, that is, "Thieves' World," and its
elite, vory v zakone, that is, "Thieves Within the Code."
82. Michael Specter, Yeltsin's Anti-Crime Decree Sets Off a Storm of Outrage, N.Y.
Trms, June 19, 1994, § 1, at 14 [hereinafter Specter, Yeltsin's Anti-Crime Decree]. The
desire of the Russian people for strong organized crime control measures is understanda-
ble. See generally Michael Specter, New Moscow Mob Terror: Car Bombs, N.Y. TurAs,
June 10, 1994, at A6. Apart from the now common gangland killings, daytime robberies,
and the bribery of officials, car bombings are becoming the frequent devices of Muscovite
mobsters. Beginning in June 1994, bombs exploded in some of the most populated pedes-
trian areas, often during rush hour. The city's residents felt less safe than ever. President
Yeltsin calls crime in Russia a superpower and promises to make law and order a top
priority. The law his cabinet proposed made the prosecution of organized crime leaders
easier, although the right-wing political leaders called for harsher measures, including the
immediate execution of gang members. While estimates vary, most experts agree that
gangsters control at least half of the private enterprise in Russia. Thousands of gangs ex-
tort money freely and openly from the small businessman, the large industrial enterprises,
and everyone in between. More than a dozen bankers had been killed by mid-1994 by
mobsters. Private businesses are the daily targets of intimidation campaigns. Aleksandr
Mikhaiov of the domestic state security service said, "[Gangsters] attack when they want
to. It no longer matters to them how many people are around when they do it." Id. Kill-
ings rose by 43% in the first five months of 1994 as compared to the same period in the
previous year, after doubling from 1992. Police officials estimated that at least 150,000
illegal handguns are owned by criminals. After security officials installed metal detectors
in Parliament, twenty guns were confiscated in the first five days. The police officials
warned that unless tougher measures were taken, the situation would continue to worsen.
Statistics released by the Interior Ministry last summer showed that more than 5,600 gan-
gland groups are operating now in Russia, almost 10 times the number in 1990; in the last
year, more than $70 billion worth of merchandise was confiscated from criminals; nearly
25,000 crimes were committed with firearms last year, and by mid-1994 homicides had
increased nearly 50% in the capital. Specter, Yeltsin's Anti-Crime Decree, supra.
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For anyone curious enough, a wealth of fascinating detail on in-
ternational organized crime can be compiled from commissions, par-
liamentary inquiries, international law enforcement seminars, and
court proceedings. These developments, too, must be put into the
context of two of the most important social, economic, and political
developments worldwide: the creation in 1992 of the European Eco-
nomic Community's integrated market and the collapse of the Soviet
Empire. Something, too, ought to be said about efforts to integrate
the economics of North and South America. What can be seen ought
to be a matter of deep concern for anyone who cares about peace and
justice in the world. In fact, international organized crime is the chal-
lenge of the future for criminal justice.83
America is, in fact, decades ahead of any country in the world in
fighting organized crime, yet much remains to be done. On May 25,
1994, FBI Director Louis Freeh told the Senate Permanent Subcom-
mittee on Investigation that it had taken the nation thirty-five years to
recognize the threat of the mob, obtain the necessary legal tools to
fight it, and to reorient law enforcement to the task, yet the mob had
still "not been overcome." 84 The individual countries of Europe re-
main where the United States was in the 1920s and 1930s, and interna-
tional organized crime is not being dealt with effectively by any
governmental body. "Borders have gone down," suggests interna-
tional investigative reporter Claire Sterling, "for crooks but not for
cops."85 If the world loses in its war against international organized
crime, she argues, "it will be largely because... [it is] hampered by all
the baggage of statehood-patriotism, politics, accountable govern-
ments, human rights, legal structures, international conventions, bu-
reaucracy, diplomacy-whereas the big criminal syndicates have no
national allegiances, no laws but their own, no frontiers. '86 She could
just as easily have added debates about "federalization." It is a sober-
ing thought. Aimost as sobering as Freeh's testimony that the merg-
ing international organized crime groups "may already have the
capability to steal nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, or
weapon-grade nuclear materials. ' 87
83. See generally CLAIRE STERLING, THIEVES' WORLD: THE THREAT OF A NEW
GLOBAL NETWORK OF ORGANIZED CRIME (1994).
84. 15 ORGANIZED CRME DIGEST 3 (June 8, 1994).
85. STERLING, supra note 83, at 245.
86. Id. at 244.
87. ORGANIZED CRIME DIGEST, supra note 84, at 1. Terrorists do not need nuclear
weapons to do horrible damage to persons and property. See John Kifner, At Least 21 Are
Dead, Scores Are Missing After Car Bomb Attack in Oklahoma City Wrecks 9-Story Fed-
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E. Terrorismm8
If international organized crime is an issue largely ignored, what
of international terrorism? In fact, it is likely that when international
organized crime successfully steals nuclear materials, it will sell them
to terrorist groups.89
eral Office Building, N.Y. TnAvs, Apr. 20, 1995, at Al. Terrorism, too, is practiced by
domestic groups. See generally JAMES COATES, ARmED AND DANGEROUS: THE RISE OF
T=E SuRvivALw RIG-r (1987).
88. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATrERNS OF GLOBAL TERROISM 1993, at 1.
Four hundred and twenty-seven international terrorist attacks occurred in 1993, an
increase from the 364 incidents recorded in 1992. The main reason for the increase,
however, was an accelerated terrorism campaign perpetrated by the Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK) against Turkish interests. Most of the group's 150 attacks took place on only
two days, June 24, 1993 and November 4, 1993; they were staged throughout Western
Europe. Had it not been for these two days of coordinated attacks, the level of terrorism
would have continued the fortunate downward trend of recent years. Fortunately, too,
anti-US attacks fell to 88 last year from the 142 recorded in 1992. Approximately 21% of
the international terrorist attacks last year were directed at US targets, and while the
number is down, the underlying factors that give rise to terrorism are not substantially
changed. The most spectacular international terrorist incident was the February 26, 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City. The effects of the blast and
the ensuing fire and smoke caused six deaths and 1,000 injuries. The WTC bombing is
considered an act of international terrorism because of the political motivations that
spurred the attack and because most of the suspects who have been arrested are foreign
nationals. Some of the suspects arrested in the case are also closely linked to others
arrested in July in a thwarted plot to blow up selected targets in New York City, including
the United Nations building and the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels. Umar Abd al-Rahman,
the Muslim cleric from Egypt who resided in New Jersey, and several of his followers were
indicted in connection with this plot and were charged with conspiracy. The case went to
trial in September 1993, and four suspects were convicted in March 1994. Western Europe
had more international terrorist incidents in 1993-180 attacks-than any other region,
primarily because of the two waves of PKK violence. The Middle East had the next
highest number-101-followed by Latin America with 97. Iran remains the world's most
active and most dangerous state sponsor of terrorism, through its own state agents and the
radical groups it supports. Iraq also continues to sponsor terrorism. Iraq planned to
assassinate former President George Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April, and its agents
were responsible for numerous attacks on international humanitarian and relief personnel
in Iraq. Last year 109 people were killed in terrorist attacks, and 1,393 were wounded, the
highest casualty total in five years. See also SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 5, tbs. 3.173
(terrorist incidents and preventions in the United States 1982-1992), 3.174 (terrorist
incidents 1982-92 aggregates), 3.175 (casualties resulting from international terrorism
involving U.S. citizens); Wayne A.. Kerstetter, Terrorism, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDiA OF CRIME
ANDJus -c, supra note 8, at 1529.
89. See Craig R. Whitney, Smuggling of Radioactive Material Said to Double in a Year,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 1995, § 1, at 2 (reporting, however, that as yet no hard evidence exists
that terrorists or states trying to acquire nuclear weapons are intended recipients of
materials).
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IV. Evaluation
The four chief factors that influence the quality of criminal justice
were identified by Pound as personnel, administration, procedure, and
substantive law.90 If we seek to evaluate-effectiveness or fairness-
our dual systems of criminal justice, we must look at those factors,
local area by local area, state by state, jurisdiction by jurisdiction. We
must also focus on the distinct kinds of crime: street crime, white col-
lar crime, and organized crime. Abstract discussions of "federaliza-
tion" are arid debates. The answer to the question of the best division
of labor between local, state, and federal law enforcement as well as
state or federal prosecution will, in fact, be different in different places
and at different times. Unlike socks, one size will not fit all. Abstract
questions of legal theory or governmental organizations have little to
do with what our people want from our systems of criminal justice or
how we should design our responses to the various challenges of the
various forms of antisocial behavior. The roles of courts in interpret-
ing the Constitution or other legal provisions, of legislatures in enact-
ing general rules of procedure or substantive law, or of law professors
in commenting on questions of legal theory or governmental organiza-
tion will surely play a secondary part to the roles of legislatures in
providing necessary resources and executives in exercising wise ad-
ministrative and prosecutorial discretion.91 This analysis may not be
90. Roscoe Pound, Toward a Better Criminal Law, 60 A.B.A. REP. 322 (1935). Pound
suggests, too, that these factors ought to be ranked in this same order of relative
importance.
91. If too many criminal cases of the wrong types are in federal courts, the blame lies,
not with the courts for their current interpretation of the Constitution, or Congress for its
enactment of new legislation, but with the executive department for its misguided exercise
of prosecutive discretion. No indictment may be prosecuted without the signature of a
United States Attorney. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1). No court has the power to require that
a United States Attorney sign and prosecute a charge he or she does not want to bring.
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 170-72 (5th Cir. 1965). Nor may the exercise of discre-
tion to bring a charge be second-guessed. Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480-82
(D.C. Cir. 1967). The exception to these salutary rules is narrow and narrowly read. See,
e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (discriminatory effect brought about
by discriminatory purpose, that is, on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification) (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)).
Justice Powell in Wayte put it well:
This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength
of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's en-
forcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall en-
forcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are
competent to undertake. Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails sys-
temic costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the
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criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecu-
tor's motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine
prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy.
All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to ex-
amine the decision whether to prosecute.
IL at 607-08. Proposals in this Symposium to make the exercise of prosecutive discretion
subject to judicial review ignore this wise teaching. The nation, however, must hold the
executive politically accountable. That it has not done. The failure here is one of leader-
ship on the part of the executive, who should formulate careful plans for the exercise of
prosecutive discretion, articulating defensible priorities, subject matter by subject matter,
state by state, area by area, and then stand or fall accordingly on the insights behind his or
her judgment and how his or her policies play out in fact. See, e.g., CommrrrrEn ON LONG
RANGE PLANNING, supra note 4, at 20-23 (setting out possible general standards, but not
particularizing them subject matter by subject matter, etc.). Sadly, for too long now, with
some important, but limited exceptions, the Department of Justice, under a long series of
Attorneys General, has been little more than a "Department of Litigation" that tries cases,
and whose public policy proposals constitute little more than an effort to increase its
power, personnel, or advantage in the adversary process. The Department of Justice, in
short, has no overall vision of justice or concrete strategy to obtain it, or, if it does, it has
largely kept it to itself. Until the nation learns how to demand more of the Department, it
is unlikely it will get it. A few units in the executive department are, however, an excep-
tion. Compare David Johnson, Strength Is Seen in a U.S. Export Law Enforcement, N.Y.
Tims, Apr. 17, 1995, at Al (reporting that American law enforcement is being exported
by the FBI, DEA, and CIA in response to the surge of international terrorism, narcotics
trafficking, links between terrorists and drug dealers, illegal immigrant smuggling, financial
fraud, corruption, arms smuggling, money laundering, and the potential theft and sale of
nuclear materials and chemically or biologically hazardous substances) with Fox Butter-
field, New Prisons Cast Shadow on Higher Education, N.Y. TIMs, Apr. 12, 1995, at A21
(reporting that money for prisons is being shifted from higher education budget; with
three-strike statute, 15 more prisons are needed by year 2000 at cost of $415 billion; if fully
implemented by year 2002, corrections will consume 18% of budget; universities 1%) and
Fox Butterfield, "3 Strikes" Law in California Is Clogging Courts and Jails, N.Y. TuMEs,
Mar. 23, 1995, at Al (reporting juries failing to convict, since they do not want long
sentences, most defendants in felony cases refusing to accept pleas, since three convictions
mandate a sentence of 25 years to life; courts are clogged; jails are overcrowded, and non-
violent inmates are being released early; prior to law, 94% of felonies handled with pleas;
since law, only 14% of second strikes and 6% of third-strike cases are pleading; civil suits
are confined to rich who can hire retired judges to hear cases) and Garvin Ifill, White
House Offers Version of Three-Strikes Crime Bill, N.Y. THMES, Mar. 2, 1994, at A13.
Why the nation should use its limited governmental resources to incarcerate the old
who are well-past the high points in their criminal careers rather than to give opportunities
to the young and at the expense of the civil justice system is unexplained by the political
figures who pander to public fears. See Timothy Egan, A 3-Strike Law Shows It's Not as
Simple as It Seems, N.Y. TmmsFeb. 15, 1994, at Al (reporting law will create a population
of geriatric prisoners at a current cost of $25,000 per year, while peak crime years of street
offenders is 15 to 25; offenders, too, resist arrest more violently because of the dispropor-
tionate consequences of convictions). See Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 1660 (criticizing
D'Amato Amendment on Guns and Violence against Women Act of 1991: "[T]he issue
here is not about whether gun crimes or violence against women should be severely and
properly punished [but] ... whether the federal courts should be further burdened with




happy news for symposiums of this sort. Finding out that questions
dear to one's heart are largely irrelevant to real world considerations
seldom pleases intellectuals, but it is time to recall Holmes's apt com-
ment about the relation between theory and fact.
This short analysis of criminal justice must be inevitably incom-
plete. Nevertheless, certain conclusions can be drawn. The remarka-
ble thing about our crime problem is not that it is bad, but that it is not
far worse. For too long now we have dissipated our energies in ideo-
logical debates over issues often of symbolic value only-consensual
homosexuality, capital punishment, police review boards, coddling of
criminals, "federalization," and the like. The problems of crime, of
course, involve more than criminal justice. Long term solutions must
be sought. But symptoms must be treated also.
Every part of our systems of criminal justice is undernourished.
Personnel are insufficient, poorly paid, untrained, and unorganized.
Our legal theories were developed in another age to deal with other
problems. We have tended, moreover, to forget that the liberty of the
King's subjects presupposes the establishment of the King's peace.92
In too many areas of our national life, our writ no longer runs. Virtu-
ally every aspect of each system-state and federal-must be
rethought-and the rethinking must focus principally on questions of
administration, not theory. It is time we start asking the right
questions.
92. RoscoE POuND, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 292 (1959) ("the safety of the people is the
highest law"; "it is an interest in peace and public order") (citing Case of King's Preroga-
tive in Saltpetre, 12 Coke 12 (E.R. 1607) ("for the necessary defense of the Kingdom") and
SIR MATrH W HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAL: HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 53 ("The necessity of the preservation of the peace of the Kingdom")).
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Appendix
I. The Federalization of Criminal Law
3 Tim COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MArILAND
439 (1911):
To-day we study the day before yesterday, in order that yester-




U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (treason); art. I, § 8 (counterfeiting and
piracy); art. II, § 4 (treason and bribery); art. III, § 3 (treason); art. IV,
§ 2 (treason).
B. Necessary and Proper Clause
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("To make all laws . . . necessary and
proper").
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 290-91 (John Madison) (Putnam ed.,
1888):
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Fed-
eral Government are few and defined. Those which are to remain
in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former
will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, ne-
gotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxa-
tion will for the most part be connected. The powers reserved to
the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordi-
nary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of
the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of
the State.
The operations of the Federal Government will be most exten-
sive and important in times of war and danger; those of the State
Governments, in times of peace and security. As the former periods
will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the State Gov-
ernments will here enjoy another advantage over the Federal Gov-
ernment. The more adequate indeed the federal powers may be
rendered to the national defence, the less frequent will be those
scenes of danger which might favur [sic] their ascendancy over the
governments of the particular States.
If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candur
[sic], it will be found that the change which it proposes, consists
much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the Union, than in
the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS. The regulation of
commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addi-
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tion which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are
entertained.
RALPH KETCHAM, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS PAPERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 174-75 (Mentor ed., 1986)
(apparently drafted by Colonel Mason of Virginia, one of those who
failed to sign the Constitution) (emphasis added):
Objections To This Constitution of Government
The Judiciary of the United States is so constructed and ex-
tended, as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several states;
thereby rendering law as tedious, intricate and expensive, and jus-
tice as unattainable, by a great part of the community, as in Eng-
land, and enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor.
Under their own construction of the general clause, at the end
of the enumerated powers, the Congress may grant monopolies in
trade and commerce, constitute new crimes, inflict unusual and se-
vere punishments, and extend their powers as far as they shall think
proper; so that the State legislatures have no security for the powers
now presumed to remain to them, or the people for their rights.
Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 246 (John Madison) (Put-
nam ed., 1888) ("in strictness, neither a national nor a federal consti-
tution; but a composition of both") with THE FEDERALIST No. 16, at
116 (Alexander Hamilton) (Putnam ed., 1888) ("the government...
must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fear of
individuals"); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824)
(holding that the Commerce Clause confers "general power").
United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670, 672 (1877):
There is no doubt of the competency of Congress to provide, by
suitable penalties, for the enforcement of all legislation necessary or
proper to the execution of powers with which it is intrusted ....
Any act, committed with a view of evading the legislation of Con-
gress passed in the execution of any of its powers... may properly
be made an offense against the United States. But an act commit-
ted within a State, whether for a good or a bad purpose, or whether
with an honest or a criminal intent, cannot be made an offense
against the United States, unless it have some relation to the execu-
tion of a power of Congress, or to some matter within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States. An act not having any such relation is one
in respect to which the State can alone legislate.
IH. Judiciary Act of 1789
Act of Sept. 24, 1798, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76 (the newly created
district courts were given "exclusively of the courts of the several
States, cognizance of all crimes and offenses that shall be cognizable
under the authority of the United States").
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IV. The Crime Act of 1790
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (prohibiting certain of-
fenses against the government, on the high seas, against the law na-
tions, or in federal enclaves).
V. No Common-Law Crimes
1 LiFE AND LETrERS OF JOSEPH STORY 297 (W. Story ed., 1851):
Few, very few, of the practical crimes, (if I may so say,) are now
punishable by statutes, and if the courts have no general common
law jurisdiction, (which is a vexed question,) they are wholly dispun-
ishable. The State Courts have no jurisdiction of crimes committed
on the high seas, or in placed ceded to the United States. Rapes,
arsons, batteries, and a host of other crimes, may in these places be
now committed with impunity.
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34
(1812) ("The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act
a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have
jurisdiction of the offence."); United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (I
Wheat.) 415 (1816).
VI. Federal Criminal Jurisdiction
United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 391 (1818)
(murder on board a warship, lying within Boston harbor, not cogniza-
ble as federal crime, since Congress had not conferred such admiralty
jurisdiction on federal courts); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat) 76, 105 (1820) (similar holding for manslaughter on American
ship on Tigris River in China).
VII. The Crimes Act of 1825
Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 65, §§ 1-26, 4 Stat. 15 (drafted by Story,
J., and Senator Daniel Webster) (definitions of "high seas"; offenses
within federal enclaves assimilated to like offenses under state law).
VIII. Revised Statutes of 1873-1878
Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, § 2, 14 Stat. 75 (Of 5,600 sections of
the Revised Statutes revised between 1873 and 1878, 227 dealt with
crimes, grouped by chapters: crimes against the existence of govern-
ment, crimes arising within the maritime and territorial jurisdiction,
crimes against justice, crime against the operators of the government,
April 1995]
official misconduct, crimes against the electives franchise and civil
rights, the punishment of accessories, etc.).
IX. Excursus on Lotteries and the Constitution
G. Robert Blakey & Harold A. Kurland, The Development of the
Federal Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 923, 927-43 (1978):t
Lotteries flourished in the United States from the colonial period
through the 1830's.9 Generally condoned by the law at their outset,
lotteries were not only popular but also respectable:
For many years after [the lottery] began to prevail it was not re-
garded at all as a kind of gambling; the most reputable citizens were
engaged in these lotteries, either as selected managers or as liberal
subscribers. It was looked upon as a kind of voluntary tax for pav-
ing streets, erecting wharves, buildings, etc., with a contingent prof-
itable return for such subscribers as held the lucky numbers.10
Many states soon banned private lotteries, largely because they com-
peted with state lotteries and engendered fraud and corruption." To
further stifle competition, states also prohibited the in-state sale of
tickets for neighboring state lotteries. Nevertheless, reflecting Jackso-
nian ideals-animosity toward legislatively-created privilege, concern
for efficiency in government, distaste for fraud and corruption, and
sympathy for the poor upon whom the burden of the lottery system
was thought to fall-the states (and the District of Columbia through
congressional regulation), one by one, proscribed lotteries altogether,
usually by constitutional amendment. 12
t Reprinted with permission of the Cornell Law Review and Fred B. Rothman &
Co. © Copyright 1978 by Cornell University. All Rights Reserved.
9. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUS-
TicE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAMBLING: 1776-1976, at 655-734 [here-
inafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS]; H. CHAFETZ, PLAY THE DEVIL 297-308 (1960); J. EZELL,
FORTUNE'S MERRY WHEEL 177-203 (1960); G. SULLIVAN, BY CHANCE A WINNER: THE
HISTORY OF LOTTERIES 12-43 (1972); F. WILLIAMS, LOTTERIES, LAWS AND MORALS 28-44
(1958).
10. A. SPOFFORD, LOTTERIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY, S. MISC. DOC. No. 57, 52d
Cong., 2d Sess. 174-75 (1893).
11. See id. at 193. See generally J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 102-05.
12. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 74-88; A. SPOFFORD, supra note 10, at 193.
The development of the law of lotteries in the District of Columbia-a federal enclave
under the jurisdiction of Congress (see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17)-accurately reflects
changing national attitudes and policies toward gambling and lotteries in particular. Wash-
ington, D.C. "had a special experience with lotteries." WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMIT-
TEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, LEGALIZED NUMBERS IN WASHINGTON 11 (1973).
Lotteries were a popular means of financing public improvements at the turn of the nine-
teenth century, and Washington, D.C., as a planned city, needed many new buildings. See
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. EZELL, supra note 9, at 102-08. A number of lotteries were conducted, with scandal
associated from the beginning. The most notorious was a lottery operated by Samuel
Blodget in the 1790's, which ended with Blodget sacrificing his personal property to cover
prizes he was unable to deliver as promised. Id at 102-05. In 1812, Congress authorized
lotteries for the District of Columbia, but the amount to be raised on an individual project
could not exceed $10,000, and the President had to approve. See Act of May 4, 1812, ch.
75, § 6, 2 Stat. 721. Congress also authorized specific lotteries. See, eg., ANNAmS OF
CONG., 14th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1816) (lottery to benefit Georgetown University). Cf. AN-
NALS OF CONG., 10th Cong., 2d Sess. 501 (1808) (petition for lottery to benefit Alexandria
church). For early cases arising from problems associated with lottery ventures, see Shank-
land v. Mayor of Washington, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 389 (1831); Clark v. Mayor of Washington,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 40 (1827); Mayor of Washington v. Young, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 406
(1825); Brent v. Davis, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 395 (1825) (irregularities in lottery offering
challenged); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (District of Columbia not
authorized to sell lottery tickets outside its borders). Young, Clark, and Shankland all
involved attempts by ticket purchasers in the same lottery to collect from its manager.
Congress responded to the corruption associated with gambling ventures in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. In 1831, the first congressional effort to establish comprehensive penal
laws for the District of Columbia contained a section limiting the operation of gaming
tables. See Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 37, § 12, 4 Stat. 499. In 1842, Congress also outlawed
the sale of lottery tickets in the District of Columbia by providing that maintaining a place
of business for the sale of such tickets would be unlawful, that contracts for the sale of
lottery tickets would be void, and that money paid for such contracts could be recovered.
See Act of Aug. 31, 1842, ch. 282, 5 Stat. 578. Despite the new legislation, gambling per-
sisted, and in some cases became legend. The Palace of Fortune, operated by Edward
Pendleton, was allegedly the favorite of lobbyists and legislators alike in the decades
before the Civil War. When Pendleton died, President Buchanan attended the funeral, and
prominent Democrats served as pallbearers. H. CHAFE=Z, supra note 9, at 182.
During the post-Civil War period, national attitudes toward gambling, and particularly
toward lotteries, changed. Congress began to move in earnest against gambling ventures in
the District of Columbia. Congress added "gift enterprises" to the list of prohibited activi-
ties in 1873 (see Act of Feb. 17, 1873, ch. 148, 17 Stat. 464), strengthened the prohibition
regarding lottery tickets in 1878 (see Act of Apr. 29, 1878, cl. 68, 20 Stat. 39), and in 1883,
adopted "[a]n act more effectually to suppress gaming in the District of Columbia" (Act of
Jan. 31, 1883, ch. 40, 22 Stat. 411). In 1901, Congress largely codified the existing law and
prohibited lotteries, gaming tables, three-card monte, and bookmaking. See Act of Mar. 3,
1901, ch. 854 §§ 863-869, 31 Stat. 1189. A Washington court summarized the law and pub-
lic opinion concerning lotteries as follows:
Although formerly permitted by law, and even encouraged, public opinion for
nearly half a century almost everywhere in this and all civilized countries has
recognized lotteries as fruitful sources of unmitigated mischief; as a cunning
scheme by which crafty knaves plunder the silly and credulous; destructive of
thrift and honest industry, and pandering to idleness and vie.... The keeping of
a shop within this District for the sale of lottery or policy tickets is something
affecting the entire country ....
United States v. Green, 19 D.C. (8 Mackey) 230, 241 (1890). The laws of the District of
Columbia continue to prohibit many forms of gambling. See D.C. Code §§ 22-1501 to
-1515 (1973). Before the provision was held unconstitutionally vague in Holly v. United
States, 464 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1972), it was also illegal to be present at an "illegal estab-
lishment," which was defined to include a "gambling establishment." See D.C. Code § 22-
1515(a) (1973).
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Two obstacles, however, hampered the efforts of states to shelter
their citizens from the perceived evils of the nineteenth century lotter-
ies. One was the contract clause of the Constitution.13 Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 4
established that any state's attempt to revoke a state charter would
impermissibly impair the obligation of contracts.' 5 After Dartmouth
College, states could forefend new lotteries but had to avoid interfer-
ing with existing lotteries.' 6
13. "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. James Wilson is often thought to be the father of the contract
clause. See B. WRIGHT, JR., THE CoNTRAcr CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 11 & n.25
(1938). Perhaps, he saw in it a means to secure "sure anchors of privilege and of property"
to protect against "the irregular and impetuous tides of party and faction." Wilson, Con-
siderations on the Bank of North America (1785), reprinted in 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
824, 834 (R. McCloskey, ed. 1967). See B. WRIGHT, JR., supra, at 16-18.
14. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 624 (1819).
15. Id. Although many historians cite Dartmouth College as establishing the sanctity
of legislatively-granted charters (see, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 324-
25 (1945)), the careful legal historian must comment on Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810), which was, in fact, the first Supreme Court case to hold a state legisla-
tive enactment violative of the contract clause. Fletcher arose from the so-called "Yazoo
Land Fraud" scandals which involved sales of public lands by a corrupt Georgia Legisla-
ture. Upon discovering the corruption, subsequent legislatures attempted to rescind the
sales, even though the land had since been resold. The purchasers retained Alexander
Hamilton, who advised them that the legislature's action contravened the contract clause.
See B. WRIGHT, JR., supra note 13, at 21-22. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice
Marshall agreed with Hamilton. See 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136-39. The land grants were, to
be sure, executed rather than executory obligations as demanded by the contract clause,
but the land grants were attended, in Marshall's opinion, by an "implied contract" on the
part of the grantor not to claim again the thing granted. Id. at 137. Consequently, the
legislature could not act to set aside the sales.
16. The Missouri Supreme Court, for example, affirmed an acquittal of one selling
lottery tickets in State v. Hawthorn, 9 Mo. 389, 396-97 (1845), on the ground that the
contract clause prevented the Missouri Legislature from repealing prior grants and
criminalizing lottery ticket sales formerly permitted. In 1821, the antilottery movement
secured a constitutional amendment banning lotteries in New York. See N.Y. CONST. art.
7, § 11 (1821), reprinted in 2 B. PooRE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTONS, COLO-
NIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1341 (2d ed. 1878).
Legislation enforced the ban prospectively (see Act of Mar. 15, 1822, ch. 71, § 1, 1822 N.Y.
Laws 73), but existing lotteries continued. In 1833, the legislature reached a compromise
with the firm of Yates & McIntyre-assignees of all of New York's outstanding lottery
grants-whereby all lotteries would cease after one more year of operation. See Act of
Apr. 30, 1833, ch. 306, 1833 N.Y. Laws 484. Public pressure on Yates & McIntyre had been
building. See J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 214-15. McIntyre was a member of the legislature
and also State Comptroller from 1806 to 1821. J. B. Yates, in turn, was a member of Con-
gress and his brother was Governor of New York from 1823 to 1825. See id at 86. There
was a basis in fact, therefore, for the Jacksonian fear of legislatively-created privilege and
profit in the operation of state-chartered lottery systems.
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Dartmouth College symbolized the Marshall Court's policy of up-
holding property and privilege against the power of the people acting
through state legislatures. With Marshall's death, however, the Court
began to expand the power of state legislatures to pursue the public
good at the cost of individual wealth. A line of decisions gradually
subjected existing state-chartered lotteries to the policy choices of
state legislatures. In Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,17 the
Court announced that state charters should be narrowly construed.
Chief Justice Taney, Marshall's successor and a Jackson appointee,
wrote for the Court: "While the rights of private property are sa-
credly guarded, we must not forget that the community also have
rights, and that the happiness and well being of every citizen depends
on their faithful preservation."' 8 Phalen v. Virginia'9 created a greater
threat to existing lotteries. The Court upheld a state's power to im-
pose reasonable limits on the duration of a lottery charter subsequent
to granting it.20 Phalen, a weak precedent because the charter in-
volved "had become obsolete by non-user,"'21 received reinforcement
in Stone v. Mississippi.22 Chief Justice Waite wrote for a unanimous
Court:
The contracts which the Constitution protects are those that relate
to property rights, not governmental. It is not always easy to tell on
which side of the line which separates governmental from property
rights a particular case is to be put; but in respect to lotteries there
can be no difficulty .... Certainly the right to suppress them is
governmental, to be exercised at all times by those in power, at their
discretion. Any one, therefore, who accepts a lottery charter does
17. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
18. Id. at 548. Men of privilege and property immediately recognized the implications
of Charles River Bridge. Chancellor Kent commented that the decision "undermin[ed] the
foundations of morality, confidence and truth." A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 15, at 327
(quoting Kent, Supreme Court of the United States, 2 NEw-YoRK REvIEw 372,387 (1838)).
An article in the North American Review, a Whig journal, lamented: "We have fallen
under a new dispensation in respect to the judiciary." Id. at 328 (quoting Davies, Constitu-
tional Law, 46 NORTH AMEsmcAN REvmw 126, 153 (1838)).
19. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163 (1850).
20. Id. The Court's attitude toward lotteries shone through oft-cited language:
The suppression of nuisances injurious to public health or morality is among the
most important duties of government. Experience has shown that the common
forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the
wide-spread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a few persons and
places, but the latter infects the whole community; it enters every dwelling; it
reaches every class; it preys upon the hard earnings of the poor; it plunders the
ignorant and simple.
Id at 168.
21. Id at 169.
22. 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
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so with the implied understanding that the people, in their sovereign
capacity, and through their properly constituted agencies, may re-
sume it at any time when the public good shall require, whether it
be paid for or not.2
3
A cycle that began with Marshall, who found implied contracts in or-
der to protect legislative charters, ended with Waite, who found im-
plied understandings in order to overturn them.
Even after Stone swept the contract clause from the paths of the
antilottery forces, state legislatures faced still another obstacle.
Although a state legislature could prohibit lotteries from operating in
the state, it could do little to prevent the distribution, through the
mails, of tickets for lotteries chartered by other states. The problems
of enforcement were too great. Because the antilottery state lacked
the power to prosecute out-of-state operators or to regulate the mails,
it would have had to attack lotteries at the consumer level-a difficult,
expensive, and unpopular task. States seeking a more efficient
method of controlling lotteries called upon the federal government to
halt the flow of lottery tickets through the mails.24 The antilottery
forces found an ally in the United States Post Office. The Postal Ser-
vice had discovere'd exploitation of the mails by several fraudulent lot-
tery schemes,25 and was seeking legislation to bolster its regulatory
powers.26 Prior to 1868, the only federal legislation concerning use of
the mails by lotteries forbade postal authorities from acting as the lot-
teries' agents.27
23. Id. at 820-21.
24. The Constitution grants Congress the "Power ... To establish Post Offices and
post Roads." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
25. For example, a firm in New York would obtain the names of persons living in rural
districts throughout the country and send them circulars through the mail advertising a
fraudulent "gift enterprise" scheme. The firm would receive in response large amounts of
money daily. Whenever a customer complained that he had not received the "gift," the
firm would reply either that it had never received the money from the purchasers or that it
had already mailed the package, thus placing the blame on the Post Office, which could not
disprove the allegations. See S. Masc. Doc. No. 57, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1866).
26. See S. 148, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).
27. See Act of Mar. 2, 1827, ch. 61, § 6,4 Stat. 238 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1303
(1976)). In 1821, the House had passed a resolution calling for a report by the Committee
on the District of Columbia on the number and profits of lotteries. ArNALs OF CONG.,
16th Cong., 2d Sess. 757 (1821).
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B. Early Federal Attempts To Control Lotteries Through Regulation of the
Mails
Congress enacted its first significant limitation on state lotteries
in 1868. Hidden in an "Act to further amend the postal Laws," 28 the
provision stated that: "it shall not be lawful to deposit in a post office,
to be sent by mail, any letters or circulars concerning lotteries, so-
called gift concerts, or other similar enterprises offering prizes of any
kind on any pretext whatever. ' 29 A provision that would have al-
lowed the postmaster to open letters suspected of containing lottery
materials was eliminated in conference,30 making the new statute diffi-
cult to enforce. A provision imposing penalties on postal employees
for unlawfully detaining or delaying mail remained in force,31 and,
although it did not apply to mail prohibited by the new statute, postal
authorities had no way, in the typical situation, to ascertain the con-
tents of suspected letters without contravening the fourth amend-
ment.32 When Congress codified the postal laws in 1872,33 it reworded
the 1868 limitation on the mailing of lottery materials, leaving only
illegal lotteries subject to the prohibition.M
28. Act of July 27, 1868, cl. 246, 15 Stat. 194. The Act concerned, inter alia, the free
return of nondeliverable mail (id- § 1), the establishment of postal money orders (id. § 2),
and a discount for sales of postage stamps to vendors (i. § 12).
29. Id §13. The Senate had added the antilottery provision to the House bill. See
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4175 (1868).
30. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4412 (1868). Chairman Farnsworth of the
House Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads reported that this would be a "dan-
gerous power to confer upon postmasters." Id. The limitation on the mailing of lottery
tickets, however, sparked little dispute and no open debate.
31. See REv. STAT. §§ 3890, 3891 (1875). The Attorney General observed:
While it may be lawful... to detain and refuse to deliver a letter or circular
within the prohibition of the statute, it is unlawful for him to detain or delay any
letter which is not ... within that prohibition .... The officer may have acted in
perfect good faith... he may have had reasonable ground to believe.., that the
letter detained was within the prohibition of the statute; and yet I cannot say...
that such a plea would be a good defence, either to a public prosecution, or to a
private suit, by the person aggrieved.
12 Op. Att'y Gen. 538, 539 (1868).
32. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
33. See Act of June 8, 1872, cl. 335, 17 Stat. 283.
34. The section provided:
That it shall not be lawful to convey by mail, nor to deposit in a post-office to be
sent by mail, any letters or circulars concerning illegal lotteries, so-called gift-
concerts, or other similar enterprises offering prizes, or concerning schemes de-
vised and intended to deceive and defraud the public for the purpose of obtaining
money under false pretenses ....
IA. § 149. Because no open debate or report discussed the new language, it is not clear
whether Congress intended a policy change. Chairman Farnsworth of the House Commit-
tee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads introduced the bill, H.R. 1, 42d Cong., 2d Sess.
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During the next few years, while the nation fought a depression,
criticism of remaining state-chartered lotteries intensified.3 5 Between
1872 and 1876, seven additional states enacted constitutional amend-
ments forbidding their legislatures to authorize lotteries for any pur-
pose.36 Yet the populace apparently bought more tickets than ever.
The Assistant Attorney General of New York, for example, reported
that in New York City alone, thirty-three lottery agencies received an
average total of more than 9,500 letters each week.37
In 1876, Congress amended the restriction on the mailing of lot-
tery materials by striking the word "illegal. ' 38 The change reflected a
congressional determination to exclude from the mails materials from
all lotteries, including those chartered by state legislatures. 39 Major
and recurring constitutional questions were fervently argued on the
Senate floor and decisively answered with a vote adopting the pro-
posed amendment.40
(1872), and said that it made no major changes in existing law. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
2d Sess. 15 (1871). The law continued to prohibit postal officials from acting as lottery
agents. See Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 79, 17 Stat. 294.
35. See J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 238-41.
36. A. SPOFFORD, supra note 10, at 193. Eastern states adopted antilottery amend-
ments based on experience with the lotteries. Antilottery provisions in Western constitu-
tions (see, e.g., NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. IV, § 24, reprinted in 2 B. PooRE, supra note 16,
at 1247), however, are apparently examples of lawyers copying old documents when draft-
ing new texts (see DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 417-18).
37. J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 238. The report cited 7,661 ordinary and 1,993 regis-
tered letters as the weekly average. Id.
38. See Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, § 2, 19 Stat. 90.
39. "The object of the amendment to [REv. STAT. § 38941 is to secure uniformity and
prohibit lottery circulars of any kind from passing through the mails." 4 CONG. REC. 3656
(1876) (remarks of Rep. Cannon, of the House Comm. on the Post-Office and Post-Roads)
(reporting H.R. 2575, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876)). For consistent interpretations of con-
gressional intent see Homer v. United States, 147 U.S. 449, 456 (1893); 15 Op. Att'y Gen.
203, 204 (1877).
40. The Senate clearly saw the issues raised by the federal prohibition:
The difficulty which the [Post Office] Department labors under is in determining
what are and what are not legal lotteries. A great many schemes are gotten up,
some in the Territories, some of them in operation to-day apparently with the
forms of law, but yet of doubtful legal force, and they are transmitting their mat-
ter through the mails, and the whole thing proves to be a fraud upon the commu-
nity; and the question arises whether it is not wiser and better to treat all lotteries,
whether legal or illegal, as precisely the same, or as a system of gambling which a
wise course in legislation will not only justify but demand at our hands shall be
stopped.
4 CONG. REc. 4262 (1876) (remarks of Senator Hamlin). Debate in the Senate also
touched upon the propriety of congressional action with respect to local lottery activity:
[I]f a State chooses to authorize and legalize a lottery, call it gambling, if you
please, and gambling it is, that is a matter entirely for the consideration of that
State ....
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A year later, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of closing the mails to lottery materials. The Court, in Ex parte Jack-
son,41 held that "[t]he power possessed by Congress embraces the reg-
ulation of the entire postal system of the country."42 By construing
the prohibition as it would any other postal regulation, the Court
avoided the issue of interference with prerogatives reserved to the
states by the tenth amendment. Instead, the Court warned against the
infringement of individual rights:
The right to designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the
right to determine what shall be excluded. The difficulty attending
the subject arises, not from the want of power in Congress to pre-
scribe regulations as to what shall constitute mail matter, but from
the necessity of enforcing them consistently with rights reserved to
the people, of far greater importance than the transportation of the
mail.4 3
Thus, subject to first and fourth amendment constraints, Jackson sus-
tained the power of Congress "to refuse its facilities for the distribu-
tion of matter deemed injurious to the public morals."44
Id. (remarks of Senator West). The breadth of the prohibition was a particular concern:
Certainly the Senate does not mean to decide that the citizens of a State where
lotteries are legal have no right to send a lottery scheme or circular from one
portion of the State to another. That seems to me to be interfering with the rights
of the people of the States where they choose to think that the sale of lottery
tickets is not criminal or improper.
Id (remarks of Senator Whyte).
41. 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
42. Id. at 732.
43. Id. The Court discussed potential first and fourth amendment problems under the
statute (see id. at 733-34), and then announced the limits of permissible interference with
the mails, cautioning Congress not to violate constitutional guarantees:
Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they
were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The consti-
tutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against
inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened
and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, partic-
ularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected
to search in one's own household. No law of Congress can place in the hands of
officials connected with the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of
letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as to
mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great principle embodied
in the fourth amendment of the Constitution.
(14 at 733).
44. Id. at 736. The holding of Jackson became the subject of much dispute in ensuing
years. The Senate Committee on Post-Offices and Post-Roads reported S. 1017, 48th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1884), which would have prohibited the mailing of newspapers containing
lottery advertisements. The Report cited Jackson as authorizing the enactment of such
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The 1876 statutory change, however, failed to eliminate state-
chartered lotteries. The Postmaster General initially instructed post-
masters not to accept or deliver letters addressed to lottery companies
or their agents on the assumption that such mail concerned lotteries.45
Nevertheless, the Attorney General concluded that the statute con-
ferred no powers of seizure or detention; the statute contemplated
only one enforcement mechanism-a fine.46 The Attorney General
also determined that newspapers, which were open to inspection, were
not "circulars" and were thus outside the statutory prohibition.47
Consequently, the federal statute could not effectively guard against
misuse of the mails by lottery companies; it was a watchdog without
teeth.
legislation. See 15 CONG. REc. 4380 (1884). The Minority Report limited Jackson to the
statute it construed (see id. at 4383) and emphasized language in the case that spelled out
restrictions upon the power of Congress to interfere with freedom of the press:
Nor can any regulations be enforced against the transportation of printed
matter in the mail, which is open to examination, so as to interfere in any manner
with the freedom of the press. Liberty of circulating is as essential to that free-
dom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication
would be of little value
(Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (quoted in 15 CONG. REc. 4383 (1884))). Because Jack-
son affirmed the 1876 lottery restrictions, but also cautioned against overextensions of con-
gressional power in violation of constitutional guarantees, Congressmen repeatedly cited
the case in an exaggerated fashion to support diametrically opposed positions during the
congressional battle with the Louisiana Lottery. See notes 53 & 57 infra.
45. J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 240. In 1895, Congress gave the Postmaster General the
explicit authority to refuse to deliver ordinary letters addressed to persons or companies
operating lotteries. See Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 191, § 4, 28 Stat. 963. Congress had earlier
conferred similar powers with respect to registered mail. See Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908,
§ 2, 26 Stat. 465.
46. See 16 Op. Att'y Gen. 5, 6 (1878). See generally 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 306, 308-11
(1885); 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 77, 78 (1881). Ezell reports the following background:
The management [of the Louisiana Lottery] decided to test the legality of the
federal law of 1876. Ben Butler, stormy petrel of the Civil War, postwar political
king-pin and the brother-in-law of the Secretary of the Treasury, headed a corps
of nine lawyers to press the fight. [The Lottery's agent] reportedly hurried to
Washington for personal interviews with President Rutherford B. Hayes and Sec-
retary of the Treasury John Sherman, a move interpreted by northern newspapers
as an attempt to inject the lottery into national politics. Despite numerous indica-
tions that the lottery was unpopular, the Attorney General handed down a deci-
sion which was berated by lottery foes as sustaining the law of 1876 but at the
same time preventing its enforcement.
J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 247-48.
47. I do not think that a newspaper or periodical is rendered non-mailable by
containing a lottery advertisement. This does not transform the newspaper into a
"circular" within the purview of section 3894 ....
18 Op. Att'y Gen. 306, 309 (1885).
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Meanwhile, the Louisiana Lottery, which had helped to spur the
1876 amendment, continued to operate in flagrant violation of the na-
tional will. In 1868, a New York gambling syndicate had secured, by
bribery, an exclusive lottery franchise from the Louisiana Legisla-
ture.48 Declaring that the franchise would increase state revenue and
stop the flow of gambling dollars out of the state, the legislature gave
the syndicate a lucrative monopoly by prohibiting the sale of other
lottery tickets in the state.49 Although the lottery developed foes in
Louisiana, its supporters squelched attempts to revoke the franchise
or authorize a second lottery.50 The lottery embarked on its most
profitable decade three years after Congress passed the 1876 statute;
the lottery obtained ninety-three percent of its revenue from outside
of Louisiana.5'
48. J. EzELL, supra note 9, at 243.
49. Id. at 243-44. In exchange for $40,000 per year for 25 years, the Louisiana Legisla-
ture exempted the lottery from all state taxes. Id. at 244. The lottery and its shareholders
prospered:
This is a private corporation and its affairs are veiled in the greatest secrecy.
The number of its stockholders is not known, but they are believed to be less than
twenty in number. Some five or six control the great majority of the stock.
All the proceedings and workings of the company are carefully concealed
from the public. Four national banks in New Orleans ... guaranty the prizes
drawn.
The stock of the company embraces 12,000 shares at a par value of
$1,200,000. Owing to the large dividends paid by the company the shares are
quoted at $1,200, or an aggregate of $12,000,000.
The dividends are believed to exceed, on the average, 100 per cent., and [in
1889] ... were 170 per cent.
This dividend, large as it is, represents only half of the profits of the company
for a single year. The other profits go to certain preferred stockholders, very few
in number.
[T]he daily drawings . .. exceed $2,000,000 annually [in addition to
$28,000,000 from monthly and special drawings] making the enormous annual in-
come of $30,000,000, or twice the sum that was paid Napoleon by Jefferson in
1801 for the entire Louisiana Purchase.
The remarkable thing about this lottery is the fact that 93 per cent of income
is derived outside the State of Louisiana, from the other States of the Union and
the Territories. There is not a city or considerable village in the country which
does not contribute to the enormous revenues of this gigantic gambling concern.
It was the boast of the champions of the company in the recent struggle before
the Louisiana Legislature that it was "enriching the State by millions."
21 CONG. R-c. 8705-06 (1890) (remarks of Rep. Moore).
50. See J. EzELL., supra note 9, at 245.
51. Id. at 248-49, 251; 21 CONG. Rc. 8705-06, 8721 (1890) (remarks of Rep. Moore
and Rep. Price). Many smaller schemes were also in operation at the same time, although
after 1878 none were legal. See J. EzELL, supra note 9, at 241. TWo other states, Delaware
and Vermont, permitted lotteries when authorized by their own legislatures, but their legis-
latures authorized no lotteries during this period. See H.R. REP. No. 787, 50th Cong., 1st
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Pressure on Congress to take further action against lotteries
mounted over the next decade. Scores of petitions begged for con-
gressional eradication of the Louisiana Lottery, by then dubbed the
"Serpent. a52 Countless bills were introduced, but most died in com-
mittee.5 3 In a special appeal to Congress, President Benjamin Harri-
Sess., pt. 2, at 2 (1888). In 1884, the Senate Committee on Post-Offices and Post-Roads
surveyed the extant state lottery statutes and constitutional provisions while considering S.
1017, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884), which would have prohibited the mailing of lottery ad-
vertisements. See 15 CONG. REc. 4380-82 (1884). Of 38 states, only Delaware, Vermont
and Louisiana did not completely prohibit lotteries. The Report concluded: "From the
foregoing it clearly appears that the bill reported by the committee is not only within the
power and duty of Congress, but is also in harmony with and in support of the policy of
nearly every State in the Union." Id at 4382.
In reply to a House resolution calling for information regarding the use of the mails
for lottery purposes, the Postmaster General reported the existence of over 100 lottery
schemes. See H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 22, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1880).
52. J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 268.
53. Approximately ten bills a year concerning lotteries were read and sent to commit-
tee from the 48th to 51st Congresses. One such bill was H.R. 5933, 50th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1888), which would have prohibited the advertisement of lottery tickets in the District of
Columbia. Debate concerning H.R. 5933 typified the arguments and divisions of Congress
during this period. See 19 CONG. REc. 1153-61 (1888). The bill's opponents relied upon
Ex parte Jackson to show that the first and fourth amendments imposed restrictions upon
Congress with regard to lottery regulation. See id at 1155 (remarks of Rep. Rogers). They
further argued:
What is the Louisiana lottery? It is an institution authorized, organized, and cre-
ated by the organic law of a sovereign State of this Union. It is a legal institution
in so far as the State of Louisiana can make it so, as completely as any institution
chartered by any State in this broad land. Now, my friend from Illinois [Rep.
Cannon] knows that in so far as we can exercise this power in reference to the
Louisiana lottery we can equally exercise it with reference to any banking institu-
tion chartered in the State of Louisiana or elsewhere. Now, I wish to ask my
friend this question: If we can say to this lottery company, a chartered institution,
bearing the stamp and impress of the authority of a State law-nay, of the consti-
tution of one of the States of this Union-"Your advertisement shall not be pub-
lished in any newspaper issued in the District of Columbia," why can we not say
to some banking corporation authorized in the State of Louisiana, or if you
choose, in the District of Columbia, "You shall not receive the moneys of this
lottery company as deposits in your vaults?"
Id. at 1157 (remarks of Rep. Compton). Proponents of the bill often argued emotionally,
denying that the bill would violate constitutional guarantees:
I know it will be insisted that the provisions of the bill will be an abridgment
of the "freedom of the press;" but, Mr. Speaker, it will not abridge any "freedom
of the press" to do right or to publish whatever may promote the good of man-
kind. It is not designed to take away any proper or legitimate right of the press,
but only to restrain and prohibit all license to perpetrate a wrong by enticing the
young and unsuspecting into habits that will lead them into ruin, as has heretofore
been done in many instances. Some of the blackest deeds in the catalogue of
crimes have been committed under the plea of liberty. On the way to the guillo-
tine Madame Roland, [sic] exclaimed, "0, Liberty! Liberty! what crimes are com-
mitted in thy name."
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son urged that without federal aid the states were powerless to control
the lotteries:
If the baneful effects of the lotteries were confined to the States that
give the companies corporate powers and a license to conduct the
business, the citizens of other States, being powerless to apply legal
remedies, might clear themselves of responsibility by the use of such
moral agencies as were within their reach. But the case is not so.
The people of all the States were debauched and defrauded. The
vast sums of money offered to the States for charters are drawn
from the people of the United States, and the General Government
through its mail system is made the effective and profitable medium
of intercourse between the lottery company and its victims.... The
use of the mails by these companies is a prostitution of an agency
only intended to serve the purpose of a legitimate trade and a de-
cent social intercourse. 54
C. Lottery Statutes of the 1890's .
1. Tightening Antimailing Restraints
The President's urgent request provided the impetus for new leg-
islation to eliminate the Louisiana Lottery. In 1890, Congress banned
from the mails newspapers that contained lottery advertisements, 55 a
Id. at 1156 (remarks of Rep. Glass). The House referred the bill to the Committee on the
Judiciary by a vote of 119 to 113, with 91 not voting. Id. at 1161.
Some antilottery proposals did succeed. In 1878, Congress eliminated the sale of lot-
tery tickets in the District of Columbia. See Act of Apr. 29, 1878, ch. 68, 20 Stat. 39.
54. Special Message to Congress from President Harrison (July 29, 1890), reprinted in
9 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 80-81
(J. Richardson ed. 1894) [hereinafter cited as RicHARDsON]. The President had earlier
requested new antilottery legislation. See First Annual Message to Congress by President
Harrison, reprinted in 9 RicHARDSON, supra, at 44. Harrison's messages reflected the con-
cern of Postmaster General John Wanamaker. In his 1889 annual report, Wanamaker had
described the ineffectiveness of existing federal law in dealing with the Louisiana Lottery.
See REPORT OF THE POsTMAsTER-GENERAL, H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 1, pt. 4,51st Cong., 1st
Sess. 39-41 (1889). Wanamaker also wrote, in a special report, that the "entire Post-Office
Department is in point of fact the principal agent of the Louisiana State Lottery Com-
pany." S. ExEC. Doc. No. 196, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1889).
Harrison's role in the battle against the lotteries was ironic. The antilottery movement
had begun as a Democratic attack against state-created privilege; it was now ending as a
Republican attack against corruption that would have to overcome states' rights
objections.
55. See Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908, § 1, 26 Stat. 465. The Act provided in pertinent
part:
[N]or shall any newspaper, circular, pamphlet, or publication of any kind contain-
ing any advertisement of any lottery or gift enterprise of any kind offering prizes
dependent upon lot or chance, or containing any list of prizes awarded at the
drawings of any such lottery or gift enterprise, whether said list is of any part or of
all of the drawing, be carried in the mail or delivered by any postmaster or letter-
carrier.
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move it had long contemplated. 56 The new legislation broadened the
definition of prohibited matter, and specifically authorized postal au-
thorities to refuse to deliver registered letters suspected of being lot-
tery-related.57
The 1890 Act culminated fifteen years of congressional debate
over a recurring issue of federalism.58 Advocates of the bill con-
tended that more than Louisiana's rights were at issue; the rights of
the other states were also involved. Because federal control of the
mails precluded the other states from caging the Louisiana Lottery59
Id. In 1888, Congress considered a similar provision for the District of Columbia. See note
53 supra.
56. See S. REP. No. 1579, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1890); H.R. REP. No. 787, 50th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1888); H.R. REP. No. 2678, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886); S. REP. No. 11, 49th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1886); H.R. REP. No. 826, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884); S. REP. No. 233,
48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884).
57. See Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908, § 2, 26 Stat. 465. The Act empowered the
Postmaster General to return to the senders all registered mail addressed to any person or
company (or agent of same) suspected of conducting a lottery. Although he could not
open letters, the Postmaster General could ground his suspicion on any "evidence satisfac-
tory to him." Id.
58. The Minority Report issued in connection with S. 1017, 48th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1884), a bill analogous to that enacted in 1890, cogently framed the issue:
Assuming that the States are competent to protect the morals of their people
against the corrupting and injurious effects of lotteries and lottery advertisements,
and that the duty to furnish such protection rests with them, this bill presents the
grave question as to how far Congress may legitimately go in exercising unques-
tionable powers for the accomplishment of objects and purposes that do not come
lawfully within its jurisdiction. In other words, can Congress properly regulate
the mail service of the country, under its authority "to establish post-offices and
post-roads," for the purpose of preventing the circulation of newspapers contain-
ing lottery advertisements and the suppression of lotteries?
S. REP. No. 233, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1884) (emphasis in original). After references
to Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878), the framers of the Constitution, Calhoun, Webster,
and other luminaries, the Minority Report concluded that: "The present bill is a long de-
parture from the conservative opinions entertained and acted upon by the great statesmen
of 1836. If not unconstitutional it embodies a principle and policy of a most dangerous
character and tendency .... S. REP. No. 233, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1884). Quoting
Jackson, the Minority Report directly addressed the freedom of the press issue:
Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom [freedom of the press] as lib-
erty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation the publication would be of little
value. [Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (emphasis added by Minority
Report).]
... The freedom of circulation by the ordinary channels of communication is
the very essence of the press's freedom .... Deny to the press the right to circu-
late through the mails and over post-routes, which now include all public high-
ways, railroads, and navigable streams (unless sent as merchandise), and the
guarantee thrown around its freedom by the Constitution is worthless.
Id- at 15 (emphasis in original).
59. The States are powerless to extirpate the Louisiana lottery. They are power-
less even to protect themselves from its insidious brigandage. They have ex-
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only Congress could "crush this hydra-headed monster, which is de-
moralizing the young, the poor, and the needy throughout the coun-
try, as no other institution in America has ever done. ' 60
The 1890 Act broke the back of the Louisiana Lottery. "A fear-
less man was appointed postmaster in New Orleans and thousands of
pieces of mail were seized and immense masses of evidence col-
lected." 61 Business at the New Orleans post office decreased by one-
third.62 In 1892, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Act in In re Rapier:63
We cannot regard the right to operate a lottery as a fundamen-
tal right infringed by the legislation in question; nor are we able to
see that Congress can be held, in its enactment, to have abridged
the freedom of the press. The circulation of newspapers is not pro-
hibited, but the government declines itself to become an agent in
the circulation of printed matter which it regards as injurious to the
people.64
hausted their resources. The mails, the national banks, and the channels of
interstate transportation are controlled by the national authority and by national
authority alone. The national Congress and the national Executive are alone
equal to the overthrow of this pestilent corporation, which has become the rich-
est, the most audacious, and the most powerful gambling institution that the
world has ever known.
21 CONG. REc. 8706 (1890) (remarks of Rep. Moore) (concerning H.R. 11569, 51st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1890)). In general, the House debates over the 1890 legislation reiterated earlier
arguments. See id. at 8698-721.
60. Id at 8705 (remarks of Rep. Moore). Representative Hays responded in vain,
with a federalism argument:
[I]f Congress, in its supremacy, can indirectly undermine, discriminate against,
and in effect destroy the legislation of the States in matters exclusively reserved to
the States, our system is destroyed, the rights of the States under their reserved
powers practically ended, and the Government is centralized, with the States
mere figure-heads. To apply it: If a State, for purposes of revenue or from policy,
desires to establish, tolerate, or legalize lotteries, which it has an undenied and
undoubted authority to do, and which is a matter over which Congress has no
earthly concern, and then Congress can, by indirection, through the exercise of
another power, practically nullify and invalidate this action and make criminals of
those within that State that do the customary and essential acts to its existence
and prosperity according to its design and the law of the State, then the State
might as well go out of business and cease to exist.
Id at 8703 (Minority Report of Rep. Hays).
61. 1 EzELL, supra note 9, at 263-64.
62. See REPORT OF THE POsTMASTER-GENERAL, H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 1 pt. 4, 51st
Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1890). The following year, the Postmaster General reported in-
creased convictions under the lottery statutes. See REPORT OF Tm POSTMASTR-GEN-
ERAL, H.R. ExFc. Doc. No. 1, pt. 4, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1891). The new statutes also
drew accolades from the press. Of 2,259 editorials in 850 newspapers, 2,172 opposed the
use of the mails by lottery companies and 87 favored such use. Id. at 22.
63. 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
64. Id. at 134.
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2. Regulation Beyond the Mails: Legislation Under the Commerce
Clause
Congress struck at lotteries once again in 1895. Reaching beyond
its postal authority to its powers under the commerce clause,65 Con-
gress outlawed the importation and interstate carriage of lottery-re-
lated materials.66 The catalyst for the new legislation was, once again,
the Louisiana Lottery. Wounded by the 1890 Act and having finally
lost its state charter,67 the "Serpent" had regenerated in Honduras in
an attempt to operate without using the United States mals.68
The Supreme Court heard oral argument three times before sus-
taining the constitutionality of the 1895 law by five to four majority in
65. "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
66. See Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 191, § 1, 28 Stat. 963 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1301 (1976)). Sections 2 and 3 of the 1895 legislation integrated the new changes into
prior federal antilottery statutes. Section 4 permitted postal officials to refuse to deliver
any mail, including ordinary letters, relating to lotteries.
Representative Broderick explained the need for additional legislation:
Mr. Speaker, in 1890 Congress forbade the use of the United States mails to com-
panies and individuals for the purpose of advertising lottery schemes. That law
has been evaded by using for such purposes the express, and it has been deemed
necessary to amend the law so as to prohibit carrying in any way matter intended
to advertise lotteries . . . . This bill has been commended by the Post-Office
Department. The law as it exists has given the Department much trouble... [An
excerpt from the Postmaster General's most recent report was read, urging that a
bill such as the one under consideration would "strike at the root of this great evil
and eradicate it."]
A few years ago we had but one lottery in the United States. Public senti-
ment was aroused against it. When the institution was driven out by the legisla-
tion of the Congress and by the States it was reorganized in the territory of
Honduras, and has been operating from that territory throughout the States of
the Union, so that to-day, instead of having one lottery, as we had a few years
ago, we have a number. This lottery business has grown to such an extent that it
has shocked the moral sense of the people of the entire country, and it ought to
be suppressed.
27 CONG. REc. 3013 (1895) (remarks of Rep. Broderick).
67. See J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 267.
68. See 27 CONG. REc. 3013 (1895) (remarks of Rep. Broderick); 26 CONG. Rac. 2356
(1894). In attempting to eradicate the Louisiana Lottery, Congress also affected charitable
lotteries despite an intention to avoid doing so:
I have not the slightest objection to confining it to the lottery business, but to
provide that the offering of prizes shall be a penal offense at innocent church fairs
and other little enterprises of that sort, it seems to me, is going beyond what we
ought to attempt.
Id at 4313 (remarks of Senator Gorman). The problem lay in the broad language of the
statute.
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Champion v. Ames.69 Although petitioner argued that the statute in-
fringed upon powers reserved to the states by the tenth amendment,70
the Court emphasized the commerce clause and Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.71 Justice Harlan dismissed the
tenth amendment issue because "the power to regulate commerce
among the States has been expressly delegated to Congress." 72
Although the propriety of the statute was not for the courts to deter-
mine, its constitutionality was clear:
If the carrying of lottery tickets from one State to another be inter-
state commerce, and if Congress is of opinion that an effective regu-
lation for the suppression of lotteries, carried on through such
commerce, is to make it a criminal offence to cause lottery tickets to
be carried from one State to another, we know of no authority in
the courts to hold that the means thus devised are not appropriate
and necessary to protect the country at large against a species of
interstate commerce which, although in general use and somewhat
favored in both national and state legislation in the early history of
the country, has grown into disrepute and has become offensive to
the entire people of the Nation. It is a kind of traffic which no one
can be entitled to pursue as of right.73
Irony characterized the history of gambling law. At the outset,
Chief Justice Marshall's expansive opinion in Dartmouth College
stalled reform. It took a revolution in constitutional thinking, touched
off by Chief Justice Taney in Charles River Bridge, to restore power to
state legislatures. Ultimately, however, the end of the state-chartered
69. 188 U.S. 321 (1903). Champion was first argued in early 1901 and then was joined
with Francis v. Ames, 188 U.S. 375 (1903), for reargument in October 1901 and again in
December 1902. In Francis, Justice Holmes found that the definition of lottery materials in
the 1895 provisions did not encompass the operator's records of numbers chosen by lottery
customers. See notes 82-86 and accompanying text infra. The ultimate 5 to 4 decision in
Champion coupled with the restrictive decision in Francis shows that the 1895 provisions
troubled the Court.
70. 188 U.S. at 330-32. Champion sought habeas corpus relief from a conviction
under the 1895 statute. Id. at 325.
71. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Writing for the Court in Champion, Justice Harlan
quoted extensively from Gibbons:
[The commerce power] is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule
by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Con-
gress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution.
188 U.S. at 347 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 9 (emphasis added in
Champion)).
72. 188 U.S. at 357.
73. Id. at 358. The dissenters argued that the tenth amendment prohibited the con-
gressional action and that the "scope of the commerce clause of the Constitution cannot be
enlarged because of present views of public interest." Id. at 372 (dissenting opinion, Fuller,
CJ.).
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lottery systems was made possible through an expansive reading of
the Constitution. That reading came in Champion, ironically rooted
in Marshall's own opinion in Gibbons. The Court created a federal
police power where none existed before. First, federal power grew,
and stood in the way; then federal power shrank, and stood aside; fi-
nally, federal power grew, and fought the last battle itself.74
X. Penal Code of 1909
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088.
S. Rep. No. 10, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1908) ("The foreign and
interstate commerce of this country has assumed proportions so vast,
is growing so rapidly, and legislative enactments pertaining thereto
are already so numerous that it also seemed proper to collect the pe-
nal legislation relative thereto under a distinctive head.").
X1. One People Concept
A. Prostitution
White Slave Traffic Act, 36 Stat. 825 (1910).
Hoke & Economides v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320-22
(1913) (White Slave Traffic Act upheld):
We shall discuss at length but one of these grounds... [that is,]
[t]he power of Congress under the commerce clause of the Consti-
tution... [,] the ultimate determining question. If the statute be a
valid exercise of that power, how it may affect persons or States is
74. Many interests that first expressed support for Dartmouth College, and then
voiced alarm at Charles River Bridge, now expressed concern with Champion, 3 C. WAR-
REN, THE SuPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 457-60 (1922). A report to the
American Bar Association in 1917 characterized Champion as
the Pandora's box from which burst forth with amazing speed and ever-increasing
velocity the tendency to federalize and centralize, beyond the dreams of Alexan-
der Hamilton, a government whose centripetal forces had already been too
greatly strengthened as a result of the Civil War. It was the beginning of that
steady, unending, unceasing movement in Congress to stretch far beyond its real
meaning and far beyond what any fair construction, however liberal, warranted
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. This movement has progressed so
steadily, has been pressed so persistently, and has gone so far that it threatens to
utterly annihilate our dual system of government, to utterly destroy the police
powers of the several States, and finally to be about to deprive our people of the
inestimable blessings of local self-government, unless it be checked speedily and
sharply.
3 C. WARREN, supra, at 460 (quoting Hardwick, The Regulation of Commerce Between the
States Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States in 42 A.B.A.
REP. 215, 221 (1917)).
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not material to be considered. It is the supreme law of the land and
persons and States are subject to it.
Congress is given power "to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several States." The power is direct; there is
no word of limitation in it, and its broad and universal scope has
been so often declared as to make repetition unnecessary. And, be-
sides, it has had so much illustration by cases that it would seem as if
there could be no instance of its exercise that does not find an ad-
mitted example in some one of them. Experience, however, is the
other way, and in almost every instance of the exercise of the power
differences are asserted from previous exercises of it and made a
ground of attack. The present case is an example.
Commerce among the States, we have said, consists of inter-
course and traffic between their citizens, and includes the transpor-
tation of persons and property. There may be, therefore, a
movement of persons as well as of property; that is, a person may
move or be moved in interstate commerce. And the act under con-
sideration was drawn in view of that possibility. What the act con-
demns is transportation obtained or aided or transportation induced
in interstate commerce for the immoral purposes mentioned. But
an objection is made and urged with earnestness. It is said that it is
the right and privilege of a person to move between States and that
such being the right, another cannot be made guilty of the crime of
'inducing or assisting or aiding in the exercise of it and "that the
motive or intention of the passenger, either before beginning the
journey, or during or after completing it, is not a matter of interstate
commerce." The contentions confound things important to be dis-
tinguished. It urges a right exercised in morality to sustain a right to
be exercised in immorality. It is the same right which attacked the
law of Congress which prohibits the carrying of obscene literature
and articles designed for indecent and immoral use from one State
to another. Act of February 8, 1897, 29 Stat. 512, c. 172. United
States v. Popper, 98 F. 423 (1899) .... It is the same right which was
excluded as an element as affecting the constitutionality of the act
for the suppression of lottery traffic through national and interstate
commerce. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903) .... It is
the right given for beneficial exercise which is attempted to be per-
verted to and justify baneful exercise as in the instances stated and
which finds further illustration in Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137
(1902) .... This constitutes the supreme fallacy of plaintiff's error.
It pervades and vitiates their contentions.
Plaintiffs in error admit that the States may control the immo-
ralities of its citizens. Indeed, this is their chief insistence, and they
especially condemn the act under review as a subterfuge and an at-
tempt to interfere with the police power of the States to regulate the
morals of their citizens and assert that it is in consequence an inva-
sion of the reserved powers of the States. There is unquestionably a
control in the States over the morals of their citizens, and, it may be
admitted, it extends to making prostitution a crime. It is a control,
however, which can be exercised only within the jurisdiction of the
States, but there is a domain which the States cannot reach and over
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which Congress alone has power; and if such power be exerted to
control what the States cannot it is an argument for-not against-
its legality. Its exertion does not encroach upon the jurisdiction of
the States. We have cited examples; other may be adduced. The
Pure Food and Drugs Act (June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768) is a
conspicuous instance. In all of the instances a clash of national leg-
islation with the power of the States was urged, and in all rejected.
Our dual form of government has its perplexities, State and Na-
tion having different spheres of jurisdiction, as we have said, but it
must be kept in mind that we are one people; and the powers re-
served to the States and those conferred on the Nation are adapted
to be exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote
the general welfare, material and moral. This is the effect of the
decisions, and surely if the facility of interstate transportation can
be taken away from the demoralization of lotteries, the debasement
of obscene literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons,
the impurity of food and drugs, the like facility can be taken away
from the systematic enticement to and the enslavement in prostitu-
tion and debauchery of women, and, more insistently, of girls.
B. Narcotics
Act of Feb. 8, 1909, ch. 100, §§ 1-2, 35 Stat. 614 (prohibiting the
importation of opium).
Brolan v. United States, 236 U.S. 216, 222 (1915) (Act of Feb. 8,
1909, upheld) (stating that police power in respect to public health,
morals, and welfare may only be exercised by states is an argument
"so wholly devoid of merit as to be frivolous").
Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (Harrison Narcotic Drug
Act; using the taxing power control narcotics).
United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919) (Harrison Narcotic
Drug Act upheld).
C. Extortion
Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979, as amended, July 3,
1946, ch. 537, 60 Stat. 420 (Hobbs Act).
United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 420-21 (1956) (upholding
the Hobbs Act); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960)
("affecting commerce" interpreted in light of NLRB v. Reliance Fuel
Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963)); "the term affecting commerce
represents 'the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissi-
ble under the Commerce Clause."' (emphasis in original).
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XII. Revision of 1948
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1-6005 (1989 & Supp. V 1994) ("Title 18 of the United States Code,
entitled Crimes and Criminal Procedure: is hereby revised, codified
and enacted into positive Law...
XIII. 18 U.S.C. § 891
Title H of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, 82 Stat.
159 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 891 et seq. (1989)) (extortionate exten-
sions of credit; affect on commerce declared by congressional finding).
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150-59 (1971) (citations and
footnotes omitted):
The question in this case is whether Title II of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act... as construed and applied to Petitioner is a
permissible exercise by Congress of its powers under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.
The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of
problems. First, the use of channels of interstate or foreign com-
merce which Congress deems are being misused, as, for example,
the shipment of stolen goods (18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-2315) or of persons
who have been kidnaped (18 U.S.C. § 1201). Second, protection of
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as, for example, the
destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. § 32), or persons or things in
commerce, as, for example, thefts from interstate shipments (18
U.S.C. § 659). Third, those activities affecting commerce. It is with
this last category that we are here concerned.
Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden said:
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be,
that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the
nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States gener-
ally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State,
which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary
to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general pow-
ers of the government. The completely internal commerce of a
State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself.
Decisions which followed departed from that view; but by the
time of United States v. Darby, the broader view of the Commerce
Clause announced by Chief Justice Marshall had been restored.
Chief Justice Stone wrote for a unanimous Court in 1942 that Con-
gress could provide for the regulation of the price of intrastate milk,
the sale of which, a competition with interstate milk, affects the
price structure and federal regulation of the latter. In United States
v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., he said the commerce power "extends to
those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or
the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation
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of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end,
the effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate
commerce."
Wickard v. Filburn soon followed in which a unanimous Court
held that wheat grown wholly for home consumption was constitu-
tionally within the scope of federal regulation of wheat production
because, though never marketed interstate, it supplied the need of
the grower which otherwise would be satisfied by his purchases in
the open market. The Court said: "[E]ven if appellee's activity be
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still,
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of
whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been
defined as 'direct' or 'indirect."'
In United States v. Darby, the decision sustaining an Act of
Congress which prohibited the employment of workers in the pro-
duction of goods "for interstate commerce" at other than prescribed
wages and hours, a class of activities was held properly regulated by
Congress without proof that the particular intrastate activity against
which a sanction was laid had an effect on commerce. A unanimous
Court said:
Congress has sometimes left it to the courts to determine
whether the intrastate activities have the prohibited effect on the
commerce, as in the Sherman Act. It has sometimes left it to an
administrative board or agency to determine whether the activities
sought to be regulated or prohibited have such effect, as in the case
of the Interstate Commerce Act, and the National Labor Relations
Act, or whether they come within the statutory definition of the
prohibited Act, as in the Federal Trade Commission Act. And
sometimes Congress itself has said that a particular activity affects
the commerce, as it did in the present Act, the Safety Appliance Act
and the Railway Labor Act. In passing on the validity of legislation
of the class last mentioned the only function of courts is to deter-
mine whether the particular activity regulated or prohibited is
within the reach of the federal power.
That case is particularly relevant here because it involved crim-
inal prosecution, a unanimous Court holding that the Act was "suf-
ficiently definite to meet constitutional demands." Petitioner is
clearly a member of the class which engages in "extortionate credit
transactions" as defined by Congress and the description of that
class has the required definiteness.
It was the "class of activities" test which we employed in Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States ... to sustain an Act of Con-
gress requiring hotel or motel accommodations for Negro guests.
The Act declared that "'any inn, hotel, motel, or other establish-
ment which provides lodging to transient guests' affects commerce
per se." That exercise of power under the Commerce Clause was
sustained. "[O]ur people have become increasingly mobile with
millions of people of all races traveling from State to State; ...
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Negroes in particular have been the subject of discrimination in
transient accommodations, having to travel great distances to secure
the same; ... often they have been unable to obtain accommoda-
tions and have had to call upon friends to put them up overnight...
and ... these conditions had become so acute as to require the
listing of available lodging for Negroes in a special guidebook...."
In emphasis of our position that it was the class of activities
regulated that was the measure, we acknowledged that Congress ap-
propriately considered the "total incidence" of the practice on
commerce.
Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within
the reach of federal power, the courts have no power "to excise, as
trivial, individual instances" ... of the class. Maryland v. Wirtz ....
Extortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may
in the judgment of Congress affect interstate commerce. In an
analogous situation, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous
Court, said: "[W]hen it is necessary in order to prevent an evil to
make the law embrace more than the precise thing to be prevented
it may do so." In that case an officer of a state bank which was a
member of the Federal Reserve System issued a fraudulent certifi-
cate of deposit and paid it from the funds of the state bank. It was
argued that there was no loss to the Reserve Bank. Mr. Justice
Holmes replied, "But every fraud like the one before us weakens
the member bank and therefore weakens the System." In the set-
ting of the present case there is a tie-in between local loan sharks
and interstate crime.
The findings by Congress are quite adequate on that ground.
The essence of all these reports and hearings was summarized
and embodied in formal Congressional findings.
We have mentioned in detail the economic, financial, and social
setting of the problem as revealed to Congress. We do so not to
infer that Congress need make particularized findings in order to
legislate. We relate the history of the Act in detail to answer the
impassioned plea of petitioner that all that is involved in loan shark-
ing is a traditionally local activity. It appears, instead, that loan
sharking in its national setting is one way organized interstate crime
holds its guns to the heads of the poor and the rich alike and
syphons funds from numerous localities to finance its national
operations.
XIV. Racketeering
Title IX of Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (RICO), 84
Stat. 937 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.) (inter alia, conducting
an enterprise that affects commerce by a pattern of racketeering
activity).
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United States v. Thrkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981) (citations
and footnotes omitted):
[I]t is urged that the interpretation of RICO to include both
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises will substantially alter the
balance between federal and state enforcement of criminal law.
This is particularly true, so the argument goes, since included within
the definition of racketeering activity are a significant number of
acts made criminal under state law. But even assuming that the
more inclusive definition of enterprise will have the effect sug-
gested, the language of the statute and its legislative history indicate
that Congress was well aware that it was entering a new domain of
federal involvement through the enactment of this measure. In-
deed, the very purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
was to enable the Federal Government to address a large and seem-
ingly neglected problem. The view was that existing law, state and
federal, was not adequate to address the problem, which was of na-
tional dimensions. That Congress included within the definition of
racketeering activities a number of state crimes strongly indicates
that RICO criminalized conduct that was also criminal under state
law, at least when the requisite elements of a RICO offense are
present. As the hearings and legislative debates reveal, Congress
was well aware of the fear that RICO would "mov[e] large substan-
tive areas formerly totally within the police power of the State into
the Federal realm." In the face of these objections, Congress none-
theless proceeded to enact the measure, knowing that it would alter
somewhat the role of the federal government in the war against or-
ganized crime and that the alteration would entail prosecutions in-
volving acts of racketeering that are also crimes under state law.
There is no argument that Congress acted beyond its power in so
doing. That being the case, the courts are apparently without au-
thority to restrict the application of the statute.
XV. The Future?93
The Alternative
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, ch. 27, § 9-27.000, et seq., Prin-
ciples of Federal Prosecution
93. Compare United States v. Robertson, 15 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 1994) (proof of
purchase and operation of gold mine with out of state drug profits does not show "affect on
commerce"), rev'd per curiam, No. 94-251, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 3042 (U.S., May 1, 1995) with
United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1994) (absent congressional finding of "affect
on commerce," federal offense to possess firearm within 1000 feet of school invalid), affd,
No. 93-1260, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 3039 (U.S., Apr. 26, 1995). See Linda Greenhouse, High
Court Kills Law Banning Guns in a School Zone, N.Y. Tims, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al
(reporting 5-4 decision). It may be that history is going to be rewritten. But see Woods v.
Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) ("The question of the constitutionality of
action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to
exercise.").
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§ 9-27001 Preface
These Principles of Federal Prosecution provide to federal
prosecutors a statement of sound prosecutorial policies and prac-
tices for particularly important areas of their work.
§ 9-2Z100 General Provisions
§ 9-2Z110 Purpose
A. The principles of federal prosecution set forth herein are in-
tended to promote the reasoned exercise of prosecutorial discretion
by attorneys for the government with respect to:
1. Initiating and declining prosecution;
2. Selecting charges;
3. Entering into plea agreements;
4. Opposing offers to plead nolo contendere;
5. Entering into nonprosecution agreements in return for coopera-
tion; and
6. Participating in sentencing.
§ 9-2Z200 Initiating and Declining Prosecution
§ 9-27210 Generally: Probable Cause Requirement
A. If the attorney for the government has probable cause to be-
lieve that a person has committed a federal offense within his/her
jurisdiction, he/she should consider whether to:
1. Request or conduct further investigation;
2. Commence or recommend prosecution;
3. Decline prosecution and refer the matter for prosecutorial con-
sideration in another jurisdiction;
4. Decline prosecution and initiate or recommend pretrial diver-
sion, or other noncriminal disposition; or
5. Decline prosecution without taking other action.
§ 9-27220 Grounds for Commencing or Declining Prosecution
A. The attorney for the government should commence or recom-
mend federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person's con-
duct constitutes a federal offense and that the admissible evidence
will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless,
in his/her judgment, prosecution should be declined because:
1. No substantial federal interest would be served by prosecution;
2. The person is subject to effective prosecution in another juris-
diction; or




§ 9-27230 Substantial Federal Interest
A. In determining whether prosecution should be declined be-
cause no substantial federal interest would be served by prosecu-
tion, the attorney for the government should weigh all relevant
considerations, including:
1. Federal law enforcement priorities;
2. The nature and seriousness of the offense;
3. The deterrent effect of prosecution;
4. The person's culpability in connection with the offense;
5. The person's history with respect to criminal activity;
6. The person's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or
prosecution of others; and
7. The probable sentence or other consequences if the person is
convicted.
Federal Law Enforcement Priorities
Federal law enforcement resources and federal judicial re-
sources are not sufficient to permit prosecution of every alleged of-
fense over which federal jurisdiction exists. Accordingly, in the
interest of allocating its limited resources to achieve an effective na-
tionwide law enforcement program, from time to time the Depart-
ment establishes national investigative and prosecutorial priorities.
These priorities are designed to focus federal law enforcement ef-
forts on those matters within the federal jurisdiction that are most
deserving of federal attention and are most likely to be handled ef-
fectively at the federal level. In addition, individual U.S. Attorneys
may establish their own priorities, within the national priorities, in
order to concentrate their resources on problems of particular local
or regional significance. In weighing the federal interest in a partic-
ular prosecution, the attorney for the government should give care-
ful consideration to the extent to which prosecution would accord
with established priorities.
§ 9-27240 Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction
A. In determining whether prosecution should be declined be-
cause the person is subject to effective prosecution in another juris-
diction, the attorney for the government should weigh all relevant
considerations, including:
1. The strength of the other jurisdiction's interest in prosecution;
2. The other jurisdiction's ability and willingness to prosecute ef-
fectively; and
3. The probable sentence or other consequences if the person is
convicted in the other jurisdiction.
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